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TRUCE IN THE SALMON WAR: ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY*
Karol de Zwager Brown
Abstract- The 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty was heralded as an end to the ongoing
international dispute between the United States and Canada over Pacific salmon fishing rights.
The Treaty, however, failed to define adequately the principles and processes for allocating
salmon harvests between the two countries. The parties to the Treaty have been unable to
reach consensus on annual salmon harvests since 1992, fueling a growing conflict which has
threatened to spill over to issues beyond the fishery dispute. This Article examines the
historical context of the "salmon war," highlighting changes in international law and domestic
politics that affected the formation of the Treaty. The Pacific Salmon Treaty established a
framework for the parties to cooperate in the management of salmon stocks, but did not define
several key principles and created a cumbersome voting mechanism. These deficiencies have
resulted in annual negotiations that are fraught with conflict, leading to a breakdown in the
Treaty process. This Article analyzes several alternatives for solving this current crisis. The
parties could submit the annual allocation decisions to an international arbitration board that
would have the power to bind both sides. Each country could agree to compensate the other
country monetarily for interceptions of the other's salmon stocks. The Treaty could also be
revised to provide for a default allocation scheme if the parties fail to reach agreement on
annual fishery regulations. Finally, the United States and Canada could create an international
market of individual salmon quotas. As this Article was being revised for publication, the
United States and Canada entered into an historic agreement designed to end the Pacific
salmon war. The Epilogue at Part VI of this Article discusses the new agreement and its future
implications for Pacific salmon
For several years, a quiet war has been waged between the western
states of the United States and Canada's westernmost province. This
simmering dispute between these essentially friendly neighbors is over
the conservation and allocation of a precious resource-the Pacific
salmon. Battles have been fought in the media, in the courts, and on the
water, with each side claiming hollow victories. The casualties in this
war, however, have been the salmon.
Although Pacific salmon originate in the Northwest's freshwater
rivers, they spend most of their lives swimming in the North Pacific
Ocean off the Alaskan and Canadian coasts. Many species of salmon
must run the gauntlet of three distinct fisheries-Alaska, British
Columbia, and Washington/Oregon-throughout their long migration
cycle. During their ocean voyage, the salmon from different localities
intermingle. For example, sockeye and pink salmon from British
This Article was selected as the winner of the Ambrose Gherini prize for best paper in
international law or conflicts of law at Yale Law School.
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Columbia's Fraser River, chinook and coho from Washington's
Columbia River, and chum from the transboundary rivers such as the
Stikine all migrate through the Gulf of Alaska.' Because salmon from
various regions intermingle across political jurisdictions during their
ocean migration, fishermen cannot easily target fish of a particular
species or national origin.2 American fishermen inevitably catch salmon
originating in Canadian rivers and Canadian fishermen likewise take
American fish.3 A catch of another country's fish is called an
"interception. ' 4
Due to the transboundary nature of their respective salmon resources,
the United States and Canada have always had a common interest in the
management of Pacific salmon.5 Salmon interceptions have been the
subject of discussion between the United States and Canada since the
early part of the century.6 If one country harvests too much of the other
country's stocks, the home country's management plans may be
frustrated.7 Uncontrolled interceptions may also jeopardize the support
needed for salmon enhancement programs, because nations are less
likely to fund investments in habitat protection and restoration if the fish
produced by such programs will ultimately be caught by fishermen of
other nations! Interceptions encourage overharvesting and discourage
investment in conservation.9 To prevent conflict and enhance resource
management, countries should coordinate their fishery management and
conservation plans to discourage interceptions.
1. The Pacific Salmon Treaty defines "transboundary river" as "a river that rises in Canada and
flows to the sea through the United States." Treaty with Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28,
1985, U.S.-Can., art. I, para. 7, T.I.A.S. No. 11,091 (entered into force Mar. 18, 1985) [hereinafter
Pacific Salmon Treaty]. These rivers include the Stikine, Taku, and Alsek, which originate in
northwestern Canada and flow through Alaskan territory before entering the ocean. See id.
2. See Daniel D. Huppert, U.S./Canada Salmon Wars: Why the Pacific Salmon Treaty Has Not
Brought Peace, New Directions in Marine Affairs (Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Marine Affairs ed.), Jan.
1996, at 2.
3. See id.
4. See Pacific Salmon Comm'n, Pacific Salmon Commission 5 (1988) [hereinafter PSC
Brochure].
5. See Sen. Don Young, U.S. House Subcommittee Focuses on Pacific Salmon Dispute (Sept. 18,
1997) (press release) (on file with author) [hereinafter Young Press Release].
6. See PSC Brochure, supra note 4, at xi.
7. See id. at 5.
8. See id
9. See id.
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International conservation and management of fisheries is difficult
because of the escapable nature of the resource and the lack of tangible,
divisible property rights." Under the current Olympic system" of
national fisheries management and the "rule of capture,"'" a fisherman
has no property rights in a fish until it is in the fisherman's boat. Fish not
caught by one fisherman will be taken by another. In response, fishermen
seek new ways to seize fish more quickly than their competitors do. 3
This results in a race to the resource and creates incentives for over-
capitalization of the fishery. 4
Conflicts over salmon are inextricably linked to their complex life
cycles. Salmon are anadromous fish whose life cycle begins in fresh
water rivers as eggs. After hatching, they develop into fry and then
become smolts. These juvenile salmon then swim downriver to spend the
majority of their adult lives in the ocean. The salmon's ocean migration
path covers thousands of miles and crosses international borders without
regard for nationalistic concerns of fishermen who seek to capture them.
Those salmon that escape the fishermen's nets and other predators return
to the rivers of their birth to spawn, thereby renewing the cycle. Because
Pacific salmon return to their streams of origin, each stock is genetically
adapted to its environment and shares discernible biological
characteristics. 5
There are five species of Pacific salmon, each with distinct
characteristics. These species have different migration patterns, varying
10. See Carrie A. Tipton, Note, Protecting Tomorrow's Harvest: Developing a National System of
Individual Transferable Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 Va. Envtl. L.. 381,382 (1995).
11. The Olympic system refers to derby-style fishing practices where regional management
bodies establish yearly catch quotas to regulate the harvesting of major fishery stocks. Under these
rules, each fisherman enters fishing grounds during a specific time window and removes as many
fish as possible. See id. at 383.
12. The rule of capture is a legal principle for determining when a wild animal becomes the
possession of its pursuer. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Ca. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
(stating that individual who mortally wounds or captures wild animal gains property rights in
animal).
13. See Tipton, supra note 10, at 383.
14. Overcapitalization is the unnecessary diversion of capital into developing new technologies in
an industry. In a fleet of fishing boats already capable of catching the allowable harvest, reinvesting
fishing profits into new technology to catch fish more quickly is inefficient and a waste of resources
that could be better used in other industries in the national economy. See id. at 382 n.6 (citing Seth
Mackinko, Public or Private?: United States Commercial Fisheries Management and the Public
Trust Doctrine: Reciprocal Challenges, 33 Nat. Resources J. 919,921 (1993)).
15. See PSC Brochure, supra note 4, at 6. These genetic characteristics allow scientists to identify
not only the species, but also the river of origin of salmon tested. See id
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levels of abundance, and substantially different economic value. The
chinook salmon is the largest of the five species, averaging fifteen to
twenty pounds and maturing in three to six years.16 Chum salmon
average eight pounds and mature in three or four years.' 7 Coho or silver
salmon average eight pounds, but can weigh over thirty pounds. These
salmon rear from one to two years in freshwater and mature in the fall of
their second year at sea.' 8 The sockeye salmon is a smaller species,
weighing an average of six pounds. These fish spend one to two years in
freshwater lakes prior to migrating to the ocean and mature after two or
three years at sea. 9 The smallest and most abundant salmon species is
the pink or humpback salmon, averaging three to five pounds.20 This
species migrates directly to estuaries without rearing in freshwater and
matures after two years.2 ' Chinook, coho, and sockeye salmon are
preferred species and command prices of between $1.00 and $2.25 per
pound.2 Pink and chum salmon earn lower prices in the market, worth
between $0.15 and $0.60 per pound. 3
The goal of fishery management is to manage annual harvests to
ensure the continued migration of these species. To accomplish this goal,
fishery managers must ensure that sufficient numbers of fish return each
year to their native rivers to spawn. This optimal "escapement" 24 is
achieved by managing harvests through catch quotas or ceilings, limited
fishing seasons and areas, regulated fishing gear, minimum size limits,
and limits on the numbers of licensed commercial fishermen. Managing
the fisheries to provide for optimal escapement in the current year-and
maximum sustainable yields in the future-requires the cooperation and
mutual assurances of each region in the salmon's range.25
Fisheries management is further complicated by changes in both
ocean and freshwater environmental variables. Ocean conditions such as
16. Seeid. at8.
17. See id. at 8-9.
18. See id. at9.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Huppert, supra note 2, at 1.
23. See id.
24. See id. "Escapement" refers to the number of mature salmon that "escape" fisheries and return
to rivers and lakes to spawn. See id. at 2.
25. See Daniel D. Huppert, Why the Pacific Salmon Treaty Failed to End the Salmon Wars 5-6
(Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Marine Affairs SMA 95-1, 1995), as support for this paragraph.
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water temperature, coastal upwelling, and prey populations affect the
abundance of adult salmon. Freshwater environmental conditions such as
river flow, gravel condition, and snowpack impact the spawning rates
and survival of young salmon. Furthermore, escapement rates of
previous years have a cyclical effect as these salmon mature and return to
their river of origin to spawn. Each of these variables fluctuates widely
from year to year and is extremely difficult to predict. Thus, fishery
managers must establish annual catch limits using forecasts of salmon
populations based on insufficient data derived from a highly variable
environment.26
Fish managers must also resolve the competing claims of commercial,
recreational, and native fisheries. In Washington and Oregon, Native
American treaty tribes exercise harvest rights for both ceremonial
purposes and commercial sale.2 7 British Columbia's native tribes (called
First Nations) are negotiating similar fishing rights in Canada.2"
Recreational fishing interests compete with commercial fishing interests
for shares of the harvest. These diverse groups rely on Pacific salmon for
sustenance, pleasure, and profit.29 For these stakeholders, salmon fishing
has social and political significance, as well as economic value.3" Success
requires meeting the scientific needs of conservation, while gaining
political approval in a highly divisive public forum.
The goal of international fishery management is to develop a process
that maximizes the production of salmon for all, while equitably
balancing the claims of each stakeholder in the process. Effective
management, however, requires international cooperation to assure that
each party competing for the resource gets its "fair share." Untangling
stakeholders' competing claims is difficult even within one jurisdiction.
With the added complication of an international arena and three rival
regions, fishery management has proved to be a daunting task. It is in the
collective interest of both the United States and Canada to manage the
annual take of this renewable resource to assure continued rich harvests
in the future.
26. See id.
27. See Huppert, supra note 2, at 1.
28. See id
29. See 1995-1996 Pac. Salmon Commission Ann. Rep. at xii [hereinafter PSC 95/96 Annual
Report].
30. See Huppert, supra note 2, at 1.
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After years of conflict and negotiation between the United States and
Canada, the parties signed the Pacific Salmon Treaty in 1985 to put an
end to the salmon war. This Treaty proposed two fundamental principles
to guide the parties in managing this common resource. The first is
conservation, to "prevent overfishing and provide for optimum
production" of salmon in the region;3' the second is equity, to "provide
for each Party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon
originating in its waters." '32
These two principles are interdependent: the conservation principle
ensures that the salmon resource remains abundant, while the equity
principle establishes a framework for allocating this resource, which is
essential to achieving conservation.33 Without a provision for equitable
sharing, there is little incentive for a country to conserve, protect, and
enhance its salmon habitat because the benefits of its actions will flow to
the other country.34 Full and effective implementation of the Treaty
depends on a commitment to both principles.
Although both parties have agreed to these principles, in practice it
has been exceedingly difficult to implement them. The most divisive
issue is the salmon allocation problem-the distribution of annual
harvests between countries and among competing interests within
countries.35 Salmon allocation is contentious primarily because salmon is
a valuable resource. From 1990 to 1994, the commercial harvest of the
five major salmon species in the region averaged 466 million pounds
with a landed value of around $300 million.36 Recreational fisheries take
about three million fish per year, predominately chinook, coho, and
steelhead.37 The economic value of recreational salmon fishing was
recently estimated to be between $108 million and $396 million per year,
31. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. H, para. 1(a).
32. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. Ill, para. 1(b).
33. See Canada Dep't of Fisheries & Oceans, The Pacific Salmon Treaty (last modified May
1996) <http:llww.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/englislforeignp/environlsalmon.htm> [hereinafter Canada
Dep 't ofFisheries].
34. International salmon harvests are a classic example of the "tragedy of the commons," in which
a common resource is ruined through the unrestrained actions of all, each pursuing an unregulated
and narrow self-interest. See Ralph Townsend & James A. Wilson, An Economic View of the
Tragedy of the Commons, in The Question of the Commons (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson
eds., 1987).
35. See Huppert, supra note 2, at 1.
36. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 4.
37. See id at 5 (quoting 1992 Pac. States Marine Fisheries Comm "n Ann. Rep.).
610
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roughly equal to that of the commercial fishing industry.38 Beyond
economic value, the cultural and historical value of salmon is intricately
woven into the fabric of Pacific Northwest society.39
The Treaty's negotiation mechanism has made solving the allocation
problem exceedingly difficult. The Treaty calls for decisions to be made
by consensus, giving each party a veto power. Because each of the
constituencies refuses to accept reductions in its own fishing harvests, a
consensus is nearly impossible to reach. This cumbersome process has
prevented the parties from agreeing on the allocation of salmon since
1993.4 Recent efforts to reach a negotiated settlement have included
nonbinding mediation, stakeholder negotiations, and high-level
appointments of envoys.4! ' Each of these processes failed to resolve the
fundamental disagreements between the parties.42 The lack of an
acceptable agreement created incentives for each party to aggressively
fish its neighbors' salmon stock to reap short-term benefits, exact
concessions, or revive negotiations.43 These tactics are ultimately
counterproductive, as depleted salmon stocks injure both nations'
collective interests in the long run.
The Treaty's failure to end the salmon war calls for a fresh look at the
Treaty principles and the mechanisms for implementing those principles.
It is in both countries' best interests to develop a process that encourages
good faith negotiations, maximum production of salmon, and a fair and
equitable allocation of that resource. The Treaty needs an additional
mechanism for encouraging a negotiated settlement and avoiding the
"prisoner's dilemma"45 of the current system. In 1995, a Washington
38. See Huppert, supra note 2, at 5 (quoting Daryll Olsen et al., Existence and Sport Values for
Doubling the Size of Columbia River Basin Salmon and Steelhead Runs, 2 Rivers 44 (1991)).
39. See PSC Brochure, supra note 4, at 11.
40. See Young Press Release, supra note 5. In some recent years, however, the parties have made
interim agreements covering specific species originating from certain rivers. See, eg., PSC 95/96
Annual Report, supra note 29, at iii (explaining 1995 interim fishing arrangements for Fraser River
sockeye and pink salmon, as well as commitments for southern coho and chum fisheries).
41. See Pacific Salmon Treaty: Hearings on the U.S.-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty Before the
Subcomm. on Fishery Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of Rep. Jim Saxton, Chairman).
42. See id
43. See Huppert, supra note 2, at 1.
44. See id.
45. A prisoner's dilemma is a situation where the parties would benefit if all chose to cooperate,
but each has an incentive to defect (or not cooperate) because each cannot be assured of cooperation
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court enforced a requirement that each party negotiate in "good faith."
The judge also enjoined fish management programs that violated the
principles of the Treaty.46 Although this decision represents a step in the
right direction, the salmon war has continued unabated.
Part I of this Article gives a brief overview of the history of the
salmon war between the United States and Canada, highlighting the
major skirmishes and settlements in the dispute. Part II examines the
Pacific Salmon Treaty and the framework it establishes for the parties to
cooperate in the management of salmon stocks. Part III discusses
problems with this Treaty process and the parties' responses. Finally,
Part IV proposes possible solutions to the current crisis and assesses
alternatives to the allocation mechanism. In an Epilogue, this Article
describes the recent agreement on salmon allocation, conservation, and
management.
I. HISTORY OF THE SALMON WAR
Disputes over the allocation of fishing rights in the Northwest are not
new. Throughout much of this century, the United States and Canada
have alternated between conflict and cooperation in their management of
Pacific salmon. 47 During times of conflict, each country denounced the
other with threatening rhetoric while allowing its own fishing fleets to
harvest aggressively its neighbor's salmon stocks.48 When cooperating,
each nation shared responsibility for conserving salmon stocks and dealt
constructively with its numerous, competing interest groups. 49 These two
nations have negotiated several agreements and treaties that have
enhanced cooperation in fishery management. None of these agreements,
however, have succeeded in completely resolving the issues over the
long term.
from other parties. See Morton D. Davis, Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction 108-13 (rev.
ed. 1983).
46. See Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldrige, 898 F. Supp.
1477 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
47. See Huppert, supra note 2, at 1.
48. See id.
49. See id.
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A. Early Bilateral Agreements
1. Blockage of the Fraser River Leads to Treaty
Since the first settlement of the Pacific Northwest, Canadian and
American fisherman trawled the waters of the Pacific Ocean for the
seemingly abundant stocks of salmon. But early in the twentieth century,
development began to take its toll on the fragile natural habitat of the
salmon, causing both countries to focus attention on the need to protect
the salmon's habitat. In 1913, railroad construction in British Columbia
generated debris and created rockslides that blocked salmon passage
through Hell's Gate along the Fraser River." This blockage of the Fraser
River reduced salmon runs of pink and sockeye salmon not only for
Canadian fisheries, but also for American harvests in Washington and
Oregon.5
This incident sparked the two countries to begin negotiating the
coordination of sockeye salmon conservation and management. Canada
wanted an assurance of a fair share of the harvest before it would invest
millions of dollars to improve salmon passage along the Fraser River.52
Negotiations continued from 1914 through 1929,"3 culminating in 1930
with the signing of the Convention for the Protection, Preservation and
Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries of the Fraser River System.'
However, the United States never ratified the Treaty. In 1937, a
renegotiated Treaty was finally ratified.5
The Fraser River Salmon Convention covered only a narrow range of
species-sockeye salmon originating in the Fraser River. The convention
designated a strict fifty-fifty allocation of the shared salmon resource
between the United States and Canada.56 The simplicity of this fixed rule
50. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 6.
51. See id
52. See id.
53. See id at21.
54. See Convention for the Protection, Preservation and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fishery
of the Fraser River System, May 26, 1930, U.S.-Can., 50 Stat. 1355, as amended by Dec. 28, 1956, 8
U.S.T. 1057, and Feb. 24, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 2475 [hereinafter Fraser River Salmon Convention]. The
Convention was terminated March 18, 1985, by the Pacific Salmon Treaty, but a savings clause
continued operation of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission for a transition period
of about a year. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. XV, para. 2.
55. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 7.
56. See id.
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resolved the problem for decades." In 1944, the United States and
Canada agreed to cooperate in the repair of the Fraser River to allow for
greater salmon passage. 8 The United States agreed to pay two million
dollars towards the cost of the restoration of the Fraser River. 9
The Treaty also created the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries
Commission (IPSFC) to monitor and enforce the convention.' The
IPSFC began exercising regulatory control over the sockeye salmon
fishery in the Convention area in 1946.61 In 1956, Fraser River pink
salmon were added to the IPSFC agreement. 2
2. Breakdown in Consensus on the Fraser River Treaty
Although the Fraser River Salmon Treaty settled the salmon allocation
issue for a narrow range of species in a limited geographic area, the
consensus behind the Treaty gradually eroded. Canada became
increasingly dissatisfied with its fifty-percent share of Fraser River fish.
Canada bore the vast majority of the costs in maintaining salmon habitat
and water quality for these salmon stocks.63
Activities outside the scope of the agreement also undermined the
Treaty. Canadians were concerned about increasing interceptions of their
fish in Alaska. There was no sharing arrangement for these fisheries
because Alaska was outside of the Convention's territory. In response,
Canada intentionally expanded the fishery north of Vancouver Island to
increase its share of Fraser River harvests outside of Convention waters.
This expansion of Canadian fisheries was also designed to pressure the
United States to negotiate a revised salmon treaty. These negotiations
would eventually lead to the Pacific Salmon Treaty.'
57. See id.
58. See id at21.
59. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1.
60. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 21.
61. See id
62. See id.
63. See id at 7.
64. See id. as support for this paragraph.
Vol. 74:605, 1999
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3. SurfLine Agreement
Growing concern over the impact of net fishing on the escapement of
salmon caused both the United States and Canada to ban the practice in
the offshore waters of the Pacific Ocean. This prohibition was
accomplished through the "Surf Line Agreement" signed in 1957.65
4. Reciprocal Fishing Accord
In 1964, Canada announced that its jurisdiction over fisheries
extended to waters within a twelve-mile zone of its coastline. 6  The
United States expanded its fishing jurisdiction to the twelve-mile limit in
1966.67 This expansion of jurisdiction infringed on both countries'
traditional fishing patterns. After years of discussions and negotiations,
the United States and Canada agreed to a "Reciprocal Fishing Accord" in
1970.68 This accord permitted U.S. trollers to fish salmon within three to
twelve miles of Vancouver Island and Canadian trollers to fish off the
coast of Washington State.69 The accord also called for consultations
"regarding all matters of mutual concern related to the fisheries for
Pacific salmon." 0 The aim of these consultations was to replace the
Fraser River Convention with a more comprehensive agreement." In
1977, both the United States and Canada declared 200-mile fishery zones. 2
B. International Agreements
1. International North Pacific Fishery Convention
The United States and Canada were not the only nations harvesting
North Pacific salmon in the first half of the twentieth century; Japanese
fishing interests also fished those same waters. In 1953, the three
65. See id at21.
66. See k.
67. See Act Establishing 12-Mile Limit, Oct. 14, 1966, 5 LL.M. 1103.
68. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 21 (quoting Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement, Feb. 24, 1977, 16
LL.M. 590).
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See i. at 7.
72. See id. at 21. The extension of U.S. jurisdiction was accomplished as part of the Magnuson
Fishery and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994).
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countries signed the International North Pacific Fishery Convention.73
That convention forced Japan to abstain from fishing east of 175 degrees
west.74 In 1977, the boundary for Japanese high seas salmon fisheries
was moved westward to 175 degrees east.75 This agreement prevented
Japan from competing for Pacific salmon, leaving only the United States
and Canada to fish in the salmon's primary migration path.
2. Law of the Sea Convention
In 1982, the United Nations held a conference to create an inter-
national legal framework to govern regulation of the world's oceans. The
third Law of the Sea Convention established a 200-mile Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) for every coastal state.76 The Convention gives
coastal states exclusive rights to manage fisheries within their EEZs, sets
limits on the ability of states to fish on the high seas, and creates an
obligation to conserve marine resources.77 Furthermore, Article 64 of the
Law of the Sea Convention directs states to cooperate in the entire region
in which fish migrate, including the high seas and the EEZs, with respect
to highly migratory fish stocks.78
Article 66(1) of the Law of the Sea Convention also established the
"river of origin" principle for anadromous fish.79 Both the United States
and Canada promoted this principle during negotiations for the
73. See International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, May 9,
1952, U.S.-Can.-Japan, T.I.A.S. No. 2786 [hereinafter International Convention for the High Seas].
74. See International Convention for the High Seas, supra note 73, Annex, para. 2.
75. See International Convention for the High Seas, supra note 73, as amended, Protocol of Apr.
25, 1978, Apr. 25, 1978, T.I.A.S. No. 9242.
76. See 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983) [hereinafter Law of the Sea
Convention].
77. See Bryan Walters, ASIL Briefing Discusses UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Am. Soc'y of Int'l L. Newsletter, Washington, D.C.) Sept.-Oct.
1994, at 20.
78. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 64; see also Walters, supra note 77
(discussing comments of David Balton).
79. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 66, para. 1. Anadromous fish are those
species whose life cycle begins when they hatch from eggs in fresh water, develop into smolts, then
migrate to ocean water to mature before returning to the rivers of their birth to spawn. See supra
notes 15-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the life cycle of salmon.
Vol. 74:605, 1999
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Convention." Under the "river of origin" principle, states of origin have
primary authority to regulate fishing for fish that spawn in their rivers,
both within their 200-mile EEZ and on the high seas. This principle gives
the nation of origin increased incentives to protect critical salmon habitat
because that country receives the consequent rewards for those
investments.
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention gave states legal authority to
manage their fishing resources even when their fish migrate beyond their
jurisdiction. For fish such as salmon that migrate through the waters of
neighboring states, the Convention imposed a duty to cooperate with the
state of origin in conservation and management of the fish stocks.8
The Convention called for other states to cooperate in the management
of these resources, but it did not give states of origin the means to ensure
the compliance of neighboring states. While the Convention established
the sovereign rights of coastal states over their salmon, it also imposed
on them a series of duties regarding the conservation and utilization of
these stocks. Coastal states must maintain or restore populations of
harvested species to produce the maximum sustainable yield, qualified
by certain environmental and economic factors.82 These states must also
promote the "optimum utilization" of these resources.83 Both the United
States and Canada promoted these principles and submitted several
additional proposals to clarify the implementation of the Convention.
However, the Convention failed to establish international guidelines or
enforcement mechanisms." Finally, while the Law of the Sea
Convention gave the United States and Canada additional rights and
duties with respect to salmon management, the Convention did not
define sufficiently clear standards or provide effective sanctions for
noncompliance.85
80. See Law of the Sea: Conservation and Utilization of the Living Resources of the Exclusive
Economic Zone, U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, at
23-29, U.N. Doc. E.95.V.21 (1995) [hereinafter Law of the Sea in the EEZ] (indicating Canadian
position); id. at 29-31 (indicating American position).
81. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 66, para. 1.
82. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 61, para. 3. The factors to be considered
by a state include the economic needs of coastal fishing communities, fishing patterns, and the
interdependence of stocks. See id.
83. See id.
84. Julie R. Mack, International Fisheries Management: How the U.N. Conference on Straddling
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Changes the Law of Fishing on the High Seas, 26 Cal. W. Int'l
L.J. 313, 322 (1996).
85. See id.
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3. Rio Conference Fails to Address Problem ofFish Stock Depletion
In 1992, delegates from around the world met in Rio de Janeiro for a
Conference on Environment and Development, labeled the Earth
Summit. 6 One topic of discussion was the growing global crisis of
rapidly diminishing fish stocks in the world's oceans.87 Although many
of the conference participants acknowledged the problem of global
fishery depletion, the international community was unable to agree on
effective fishery management techniques or standards.88 The committee
ultimately decided to hold a United Nations conference on the fisheries
issue alone.8
9
4. Migratory Fish Stock Conference Strengthens Rights and Duties of
States
The Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks was held in 1993."0 The goals of the conference were to assess
current conservation and management of fish stocks, improve cooper-
ation among states, and formulate appropriate recommendations.9' At
this Conference, the United States lobbied for the creation of a resolution
or declaration rather than a binding agreement. 92 Canada, along with
other coastal states, insisted that the results of the Conference needed to
be binding to be effective.93 The Canadian position won in the end, and
86. See id. at 324.
87. See Tipton, supra note 10, at 388.
88. See Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, at 145-46,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. II) (1992); see also Mack, supra note 84, at 324.
89. The resolution to hold the conference was adopted January 29, 1993. See Mack, supra note
84, at 324 (citing G.A. Res. 47/192, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 93d mtg., U.N. Doe. A/RES/47/192
(1993)).
90. See id. at 324 n.88.
91. See A Guide to the Issues Before the Conference Prepared by the Chairman, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 164/10 (1993).
92. See Mack, supra note 84, at 325 n.92 (citing Letter Dated 26 May 1993 from the Director,
Office of Fisheries Affairs, Bureau of Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs,
U.S. Dep't of State, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 164/L.3 (1993)).
93. See id. at 325 (citing Letter Dated 28 May 1993 from the Chairman of the Delegation of
Canada to the Conference Addressed to the Chairman of the Conference, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.164/L.5 (1993)).
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the conference resulted in a binding treaty called the Fish Stock
Agreement."
The Fish Stock Agreement strengthens the rights of states to exploit
their fishing resources95 and clarifies the obligation of states to cooperate
in conservation and enforcement efforts. 6 The Agreement commands
that states conduct scientific assessments of the regulated stocks,
cooperate in monitoring and surveillance of regulated areas, agree on
catch allocations, and promote peaceful dispute settlements. 9
The Agreement fortifies conservation mechanisms from prior
international legal instruments' and may provide the means for
enhancing cooperation between the United States and Canada over
salmon. Although both Canada and the United States have signed the
Fish Stock Agreement," the U.S. Congress has not yet ratified the treaty.
C. Tribal Fishing Rights
1. Boldt Decision Upholds Tribal Fishing Rights
In 1974, the "Boldt decision" disrupted salmon management in
Washington State. In the case of United States v. Washington,"°° twenty-
four Indian tribes'' in the Pacific Northwest sought to enforce the treaty
94. See id; see also The Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, art. 33, para. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.164/37 (1995) [hereinafter Implementation of Law of the Sea Convention].
95. See A Guide to the Issues Before the Conference Prepared by the Chairman, supra note 91, at
1-4. This was recognized as a general right, but not a guarantee of the ability to fish in all areas of
the sea at any time. See id. at 12-13; see also Mack, supra note 84, at 326.
96. See The Law of the Sea: The RegimeforHigh-Seas Fisheries: Status and Prospects, at 10-11,
U.N. Sales No. E.92.V.12 (1992); see also Mack, supra note 84, at 326.
97. See Implementation of Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 94, art. 10.
98. See Mack, supra note 84, at 332.
99. Twenty-six countries have signed the treaty: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belize, Brazil,
Canada, Fiji, Guinea Bisseau, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
Morocco, New Zealand, Niue, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Samoa, Senegal, Tonga,
Ukraine, the United States, and the 10 British-ruled territories. See UN. Opens Treaty to Regulate
Fishing on High Seas, Agence France Presse, Dec. 4, 1995; see also Fisheries: 26 Nations Sign U.N.
Straddling-Stock Treaty, Greenwire, Dec. 5, 1995.
100. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974); see also United States v. Washington, 626 F. Supp.
1405 (W.D. Wash. 1985) (compiling major post-trial substantive orders).
101. The represented Indian tribes included the Muckleshoot, Squaxin Island Tribe, Sauk-Suiattle,
Skokomish, Stillaguamish, Makah, Lummi, Quileute, Quinault, Queets Band, Yakima, Hoh, and
Upper Skagit River Tribes. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 325.
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obligations secured by the Stevens and Palmer Treaties in the mid-
1850s.'0 2 United States Indian tribes had been given the right to fish their
usual and accustomed fishing grounds "in common with all citizens of
the territory."'"3 Judge Boldt's landmark decision reaffirmed these Indian
treaty rights and granted tribal fishermen fifty percent of the harvestable
surplus of salmon runs in Washington state and the Columbia River
basin."°4 The grant of an "equal share" increased harvest rates for U.S.
treaty Indians from a mere two percent of the U.S. catch to fifty
percent. 
05
The dramatic increase in Indian harvest rights provoked the hostility
of non-Indian interests. 1 6 Nontribal fishermen and state entities actively
opposed implementation of the decision, attacking the federal court
rulings collaterally in state court. 07 In 1977, the Washington Supreme
Court rejected the federal court's view that the Stevens and Palmer
Treaties gave the Indians fifty percent of the salmon runs. The court also
held that the Washington Department of Fisheries could not comply with
the federal injunction because the Department did not have the statutory
authority to do so under Washington law. 8 One court characterized the
resistance as one of "the most concerted official and private efforts to
frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century."' 109
The federal court reacted to this defiance by undertaking the direct
supervision of Washington fisheries insofar as necessary to preserve
102. The Stevens and Palmer Treaties are a series of treaties negotiated in 1854-1855 by
Governor Stevens of the Territory of Washington and Governor Palmer of the Oregon Territory. See
id. at 349.
103. The pertinent provision of the Stevens and Palmer treaties provides in part: "The right of
taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in
common with all citizens of the territory." Id. at 331.
104. See United States v. Washington, 626 F. Supp. at 1459.
105. Historically, the average Indian share was about 2% overall and 1.4% of the Fraser River
sockeye fishery. See United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1032 (W.D. Wash. 1978)
(overall); id. at 1051 (sockeye). The new allocation was deemed to be about 45-55% of qualifying
runs. See Washington v. Washington State Comm. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
685 (1979).
106. See Joy A. Yanagida, The Pacific Salmon Treaty, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 577, 580 (1987).
107. See United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. at 1028-35.
108. See Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash. 2d 677, 689, 565 P.2d 1151, 1157
(1977) ("[Tlhe Department of Fisheries is authorized only to promulgate regulations for
conservation purposes. It cannot act to comply with a federal court order which imposes upon it a
duty outside its statutory authority.").
109. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.
1978).
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Indian treaty fishing rights.110 The federal Departments of Commerce and
the Interior stepped in and adopted emergency regulations specifically
for tribal fisheries."'
Salmon stocks covered by these Indian treaties, such as Columbia
River chinook salmon, migrate through Canadian and Alaskan waters."1
Courts have yet to resolve whether to include Alaskan salmon harvests in
calculating the fifty-percent Indian share.'13 Disputes over harvest
allocation prevented agreement on a new treaty regime until treaty
Indians agreed not to press their claims against Alaska's chinook
harvests in the Baldrige Stipulation."4
2. Baldrige Stipulation
Although the Boldt decision improved tribal access to salmon in
Washington, the treaty tribes were growing increasingly dissatisfied with
the allocation and conservation of salmon in the region, particularly of
chinook."5 The treaty tribes filed a lawsuit against Secretary of the
Interior Malcolm Baldrige and the States of Alaska, Oregon, and
Washington in 1984.116 The tribes claimed that the U.S. government and
the states had failed to abide by the Stevens and Palmer treaties and had
unfairly allocated chinook salmon resources. 117 This new lawsuit sought
to include Alaskan interceptions of Northwest-origin salmon in
calculating the fifty-percent harvest allocated to non-Indian fishermen."'
The lawsuit impeded a resolution of the Pacific Salmon Treaty
negotiations because each party was reluctant to reach a final agreement
while the lawsuit was pending. For the Indian tribes, a victory in the
Confederated Tribes lawsuit would have been hollow without an
110. See United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020; see also Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n,
573 F.2d 1123.
111. See 42 Fed. Reg. 30,842 (1977) (Commerce); 42 Fed. Reg. 31,450 (1977) (Interior).
112. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 7.
113. See id.
114. See id. at8.
115. See Thomas C. Jensen, The United States-Canada Pacific Salmon Interception Treaty: An
Historical andLegal Overview, 16 Envtl. L. 363,389 (1986).
116. See Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldrige, 605 F. Supp.
833 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
117. Seeid. at 834.
118. See Jensen, supra note 115, at 398.
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allocation agreement with Canada.1 9 Any reduction in Alaskan salmon
harvests would not have increased the tribal salmon take because
Canadian, rather than Indian, fishermen would harvest the forgone
Alaskan catch. 20 Alaska refused to commit itself to the constraints of an
international Treaty as long as the tribal lawsuit threatened further
reductions in Alaskan harvest ceilings.' Canada refused to reduce its
harvests unless Alaska agreed to be bound by the new Treaty."2
This vicious circle was ultimately broken by a delicate agreement
between the twenty-four tribes, Alaska, the United States, Oregon, and
Washington."2 The agreement, entered as a stipulation during the
Confederated Tribes litigation, establishes standards and a mechanism
for allocating Pacific Northwest chinook stocks that migrate to waters off
Alaska. 24 The Baldrige Stipulation provides that the tribes have veto
power over salmon allocations but cannot litigate their legality.'25
The stipulation was to be given effect through the Pacific Salmon
Treaty. Each of the parties agreed to give the Pacific Salmon
Commission the power to decide salmon allocation. This Commission,
created by the Pacific Salmon Treaty, could make decisions based only
on the unanimous vote of all represented parties. The stipulation also
provided a mechanism to ensure that the parties reached a timely
settlement. If the U.S. Section of the Commission failed to make the
necessary determinations of chinook allocation by February 1st of each
year, there would be no chinook fishery or retention of any chinook
caught. Without an agreement, chinook could be fished only if the U.S.
Section of the Commission authorized the catch or if chinook were
caught incidentally in net fisheries for other species. Several specific
fisheries were exempted from the closure provision, including noncom-
mercial tribal fisheries and specific geographical locations.'26 This threat
of fishery closure, however, has never been imposed. The entry of this
119. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 584.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See Jensen, supra note 115, at 416-17.
124. See Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldrige, 605 F. Supp.
833, 834 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
125. See id. at 835-36.
126. See id. as support for this paragraph.
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stipulation and the end to tribal lawsuits removed a major obstacle to the
ratification of the Pacific Salmon Treaty.1 27
D. Incentives for a New Regime
As stocks other than those covered under the Fraser River Treaty
experienced a marked decline, the need for a more comprehensive treaty
framework became apparent.' Fluctuations in salmon abundance and
harvest rates caused one country or the other to feel aggrieved.'29
Chinook salmon stocks had declined throughout their range, and coho
stocks in Oregon and Washington were also seriously threatened.30 Both
countries recognized the need to invest in enhancement and conservation
efforts to protect waning fish resources.' Without an international
agreement on allocation, however, there was "no assurance that the
benefits of enhancement and conservation would accrue to the country or
state" making these investments.3 2
E. Difficulties in Reaching Agreement
Between 1970 and 1985, Canada and the United States attempted to
negotiate a regime that would balance interceptions with secure
compensation when one side disproportionately intercepted the other's
salmon. Complications plagued the negotiations between the two
countries for some fourteen years. Negotiators were frustrated by
problems with inadequate catch data, fluctuations in abundance and
ocean distribution of salmon stocks, and interest groups that used
political maneuvers and public relations campaigns to influence the
outcome of international negotiations.'
127. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 8. If the Treaty were terminated, the Confederated Tribes
stipulation would be void. See Confederated Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 837; see also Yanagida, supra
note 106, at 584.
128. See Young Press Release, supra note 5.
129. See generally Pacific Salmon Treaty: Hearings on the U.S.-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty
Before the Subcomm. on Fishery Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans of the House Comm. on
Resources, 104th Cong. 52-54 (1997) (testimony of James Pipkin, U.S. Special Negotiator for
Pacific Salmon and Acting U.S. Federal Commissioner of Pacific Salmon Commission) [hereinafter
Pipkin Testimony].
130. See Jensen, supra note 115, at 387.
131. Seeid. at393.
132. Young Press Release, supra note 5.
133. See Huppert, supra note 2, at 1.
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The decentralized nature of fisheries decisionmaking in the United
States made the task of negotiating a new agreement between the United
States and Canada difficult. Responsibility for fisheries management is
dispersed among federal, state, tribal, and even judicial authorities.134
The U.S. federal government has authority for the territorial sea,'35 but
states have jurisdiction over internal waters, including rivers and the
territorial sea.'36 The federal government can preempt state fishery plans
only if the state undercuts a federal fishery management plan.'37 Native
American tribes have regulatory authority within their usual and
accustomed fishing grounds, although the federal government can
preempt tribal jurisdiction for conservation purposes.'38 Finally, the
federal district court retained continuing jurisdiction over certain U.S.
fisheries until 1985 because state and federal authorities had failed to
protect Indian treaty fishing rights. 39 These groups jealously guard their
authority and compete fiercely to retain their jurisdiction over fishery
decisions. By contrast, Canadian fisheries management is an exclusively
federal prerogative.'40
Another difficulty in reaching agreement was the internal contradic-
tions in the American negotiating team.'4 ' Because of salmon migratory
patterns, the interests of fishermen in Alaska are notably different from
those of their counterparts in Washington and Oregon. The salmon from
the continental United States migrate north to Alaskan waters before
returning to their spawning grounds. Washington and Oregon sought to
formulate a treaty that would restrain Alaskan harvests, to ensure
replenishment of the stocks and to give a fair share of the catch to
134. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 577.
135. See Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act §§ 101-102, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811-
1812 (1994).
136. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1854-1856 (1994). Generally, the territorial sea of the United States
extends three nautical miles from U.S. coasts. See Submerged Lands Act § 4, 43 U.S.C. § 1312
(1994).
137. See Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act §§ 304-306, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1854-
1856 (1994).
138. See Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1976). Such measures must be the
least restrictive of Indian treaty rights necessary to satisfy conservation requirements. See also
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 333, 345-47 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1975).
139. See United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
140. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 578.
141. Seeid. at 577.
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southern fishermen.142 Alaskan interests resisted the constraints on their
harvests and pressed for better management and conservation in the
south. 43 These policy differences within the American negotiating team
had to be reconciled before the United States could negotiate effectively
with Canada.
During this time, the salmon wars flared up intermittently between the
United States and Canada. American and Canadian fishermen frequently
came to blows on the open sea, and even exchanged occasional gunfire
across the bows of their boats.1" As the negotiations for a comprehensive
salmon accord proceeded slowly, each country sought to gain strategic
advantages by threatening to deplete the other's fish stocks to force
concessions. The result was further endangerment of several salmon runs
and the worsening of relations between the two countries.
II. PACIFIC SALMON TREATY
Fourteen years of negotiation between Canadian and American fishing
interests finally culminated in the signing of the Pacific Salmon Treaty in
1985. The Treaty represents a balance of the fishing and conservation
interests of three U.S. states, twenty-four U.S. treaty Indian tribes, one
Canadian province, and the Canadian federal government. 45 In March
1985, American President Ronald Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney signed the Treaty in Quebec City.'" The Director of
Washington State's Department of Fisheries called it "the best news in
decades for the salmon.', 147 Others hailed the Treaty as "more than a
fisheries agreement; in many respects it is a peace treaty memorializing
the end of the Pacific salmon war."' 4 Despite this enthusiastic rhetoric,
the Treaty has not effectively ended the salmon war, although it did
allow for several years of an uneasy truce.
142. See id. at 577.
143. See id.
144. See Maria Williams & Susan Gilmore, Questions & Answers/Salmon War--Sockeye Catch
offAlaska Is Key in U.S.-Canada Salmon Dispute, Seattle Times, July 22, 1997, at A12.
145. The parties are the States of Alaska, Washington, Oregon; the treaty tribes covered by the
decisions in United States v. Washington and Confederated Tribes; the Canadian province of British
Columbia; and the Canadian federal government. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 577.
146. See It's Over! Senate Gives the Salmon Treaty a 96-0 "Yes", Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
Mar. 8, 1985, at All.
147. Id.
148. Jensen, supra note 115, at 372.
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The Treaty governs the management of six distinct fisheries: (1) salmon
that spawn in the transboundary rivers of British Columbia and the
Alaskan panhandle; 149 (2) salmon from areas around the disputed
maritime boundary between Alaska and British Columbia; 50 (3) Fraser
River sockeye and pink salmon of exclusively Canadian origin;'
(4) chinook salmon;'52 (5) coho salmon;'53 (6) and chum salmon."M Each
of these fisheries is governed by specific restrictions on harvest, gear,
and fishing areas.'55 These restrictions are established in Annex IV of the
Treaty.
The United States implemented the provisions of the Treaty with the
Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985.6 The Act carefully balanced U.S.
decisionmaking authority among federal, state, Indian, and commercial
interests. 7 This balance was necessary to give each party a voice in
Treaty decisions. The Act also prescribed the principles, institutions, and
rules of fishery management corresponding to the bilateral institutions of
the Treaty.158
A. Principles of the Treaty
The Treaty established two primary principles to guide the parties in
their management of Pacific salmon as a shared resource. The first of
these principles is called the conservation principle, which states that
each party shall "prevent overfishing and provide for the optimum
production" of salmon.'59 The second principle is frequently called the
equity principle, which declares that "each Party [shall] receive benefits
equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters."'"
149. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note I, Annex IV, ch. 1.
150. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 2.
151. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 4.
152. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 3.
153. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 5.
154. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 6.
155. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 578.
156. Pub. L. No. 99-5, 99 Stat. 7 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3631-3644 (1994)).
157. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 579.
158. See id
159. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. III, para. 1(a).
160. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. I, para. 1(b).
Vol. 74:605, 1999
Pacific Salmon Treaty
The equity principle recognizes that downstream fishermen depend
critically on the country with jurisdiction over the spawning grounds.
Conservation and enhancement of salmon stocks must begin upstream.
The country of origin must make significant investments to ensure that
salmon have unimpeded access to upriver spawning grounds by
removing natural obstructions, building fish passes, forgoing hydro-
electric development, and controlling pollution.' The equity principle
gives incentives to the country of origin to undertake these
responsibilities by assuring that its benefits are equal to the production of
salmon in its waters. Thus, Canada should be compensated for salmon
spawned in Canadian rivers but harvested by U.S. fishermen, and vice
versa.
162
When the parties signed the Treaty, they attached a Memorandum of
Understanding acknowledging that the countries did not have sufficient
data on their salmon stocks or the economic value of those salmon to
implement the equity principle in 1985.6 The Memorandum specified
that the parties should account for "changes in the benefits flowing to
each of the parties through alteration in fishing patterns, conservation
actions, or as the result of changes in the abundance of the runs.'" If
one country derived benefits disproportionate to the value of the salmon
originating in its rivers, the parties were required to develop a program to
eliminate the inequity within a specified time frame. 65
The conservation and equity principles are interdependent. The con-
servation principle commits both parties to assuring the continued
abundance of salmon, while the equity principle establishes a framework
for allocating this resource, which is essential to achieving conser-
vation." The provision for equitable sharing ensures that each country
has an incentive to conserve, protect, and enhance its salmon habitat,
because the benefits of its actions will flow to that country's fishermen.
Full and effective implementation of the Treaty depends on a
commitment to both principles.
161. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1.
162. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 589.
163. See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Implementation of Pacific Salmon Treaty,
art. III, para. l(b) (Jan. 28, 1985) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding for Pacific Salmon
Treaty].
164. Memorandum ofUnderstanding for Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 163, sec. A, para. 2.
165. See Memorandum ofUnderstanding for Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 163, sec. A, para. 3.
166. See Canada Dep't ofFisheries & Oceans, supra note 33.
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1. Factors for International Fishery Management
Beyond the equity and conservation principles, the Treaty requires
that fishery managers take into account several factors in their decisions,
such as the desirability of reducing interceptions, the need to avoid
undue disruption of fisheries, and annual variations in abundance of the
stocks. 167 These factors are important to consider for both conservation
and equity purposes. Unfortunately, these factors often conflict. For
instance, reducing interceptions could disrupt an existing fishery and an
abundance of fish stocks can lead to increased harvests, which would
also increase interceptions. The parties have relied on these factors to
justify refusing to reduce their salmon harvests. They claim that
reductions would disrupt their fishery, or that their increased harvests are
a response to the abundance of salmon. 6' The Treaty does not specify
how these competing concerns among the factors should be resolved.
2. Annexes to the Pacific Salmon Treaty
Four Annexes supplement the general guidelines and principles
established by the Treaty. These annexes are negotiated on a rotating
schedule. Annex IV is the most contentious of these documents.169 It
deals with specific salmon stock management objectives and procedures,
such as catch allocations and escapement goals for the Transboundary
rivers; 70 regulations to limit sockeye salmon catches in Southeast
Alaska; 7' limits on Northern British Columbia's pink salmon fishery;'72
overall harvest levels and U.S. interception levels for the Fraser River
sockeye salmon;73 and programs to rebuild depleted chinook salmon
stocks throughout the region, primarily through temporary harvest
reductions.'" 4Although the Pacific Salmon Treaty specifies the overriding
principles to be used to guide fishery management decisions, Annex IV
is the practical document that details specific numbers of salmon that can
be harvested by each of the parties.
167. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. III, para. 3.
168. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 11.
169. See Young Press Release, supra note 5.
170. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 1.
171. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 2(2).
172. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 2(3).
173. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 4.
174. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 3.
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The provisions of Annex IV are short-term by design. To reach
agreement on fishing limits, the parties traded concessions in one region
for gains in another.'75 These politically sensitive and uncertain bargains
were easier to reach if the parties did not have to forecast too far into the
future.'76 Because harvest levels fluctuate dramatically, neither party
wanted to be locked into a potentially losing position.'77 For these
reasons, the parties have had the most difficulty reaching the annual
agreement required by Annex IV. Since 1993, the parties have failed to
agree on a revised fiamework for Annex IV. 8 Without an agreement on
this Annex, many of the major decisions regarding conservation and
allocation of salmon have been left unresolved.
B. Pacific Salmon Commission
The Treaty created the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC) to oversee
and enforce the Treaty's provisions. 179 The principal job of the Commis-
sion is to negotiate new terms for Annex IV each fishing season, when
the old harvest limits lapse.1 ° The PSC "establishes general fishery
management regimes for international conservation and harvest sharing
of intermingling salmon stocks.''. While each country retains jurisdic-
tional authority to manage its fisheries, the Commission ensures that the
parties do so in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Treaty.
The PSC is also a "forum for consultation" on salmon enhancement
programs and research efforts. 83 The Commission, headquartered in
Vancouver, British Columbia, meets annually to review fishery plans and
to make changes to international fishery management.'"
175. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 578.
176. See id
177. See id. at 578-79.
178. See Pacific Salmon Treaty: Hearings on the U.S.-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty Before the
Subcomm. on Fishery Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 105th
Cong. (1997) (testimony of David Benton, Pacific Salmon Commissioner for Alaska).
179. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. I.
180. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 578-79.
181. PSC 95/96 Annual Report, supra note 29, at xi.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 17-19.
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1. Commission Members
The Canadian Section of the Commission is headed by the federal
Department of Fisheries and Oceans.'85 The Canadian Section also
contains representatives from recreational and commercial fisheries, the
British Columbia provincial government, and First Nations (Canadian
Indian tribes)." 6 Because the federal government retains ultimate control
of fishery decisions in Canada, these representatives may influence their
country's decisions, but cannot unilaterally block them."7
In contrast, the U.S. Section of the Commission consists of one
member each for Alaska, Washington, the federal government, and the
treaty tribes.' Each Commissioner represents a distinct group of
stakeholders that have divergent economic and political interests.' 9
Often these economic concerns conflict directly with salmon conser-
vation efforts.'90 Because each vote of the U.S. Section must be made by
consensus, each member of the Commission has a veto power.' 9' Other
than a limited mechanism for resolving technical disputes, there is no
formal mechanism in the Treaty for forcing decisions or resolving
differences.' 92
Much of the difficulty concerning the Treaty derives from the
different perspectives of the participants. 93 Canadian officials complain
frequently that they must negotiate with three nations (Alaska,
Washington, and the treaty tribes) rather than only with the United
States.94 The United States views the stakeholder process as the best
185. See Canada Dep 't ofFisheries & Oceans, supra note 33.
186. See id.
187. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 586.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 10.
191. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 586.
192. See id. Article XII of the Treaty states that either party may refer to the Technical Dispute
Board any dispute concerning estimates of salmon interceptions and data related to overfishing. See
Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. XII.
193. "While Canada negotiates with one voice, the United States must contend with fractious
states and a multitude of bureaucratic jurisdictions." Richard Louv, Canada, US. Fight as Salmon
Dwindle, San Diego Union-Trib., Sept. 25, 1997, at A3.
194. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 14.
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means to resolve salmon issues; Canada believes that government-to-
government negotiation is the more appropriate forum. 95
The Commission must decide each season how to apportion the
salmon harvests between British Columbia, Alaska, Washington, and
Oregon. These salmon harvests must also be divided between Indians
and non-Indians, and between professional and recreational fishermen.
Agreement is difficult when the parties' interests are as divergent as
those of Alaskan commercial fishermen, Canadian recreational sport
fishermen, and Washington Indian tribes.'96 The participants share a
common interest in the long-term health of the region's salmon runs, but
this long-term goal is often sacrificed in battles over short-term gains.
2. Consensus Decision Rule in Treaty Institutions
The Pacific Salmon Commission is the principal decisionmaking body
of the Treaty. The Commission is composed of two national sections: the
Canadian Section and the U.S. Section, with four commissioners
appointed by each party."9 Each section has one vote in the Commission
and every decision or recommendation of the Commission requires the
approval of both sections.' 9 The recommendation of the Commission is
then presented to the parties for approval.'99
The U.S. Section of the Commission also relies on consensus as a rule
of decisionmaking."' All decisions within the U.S. Section must be made
by consensus, with the federal representative having no vote,2"' before
the section can vote on it in the bilateral forum. 2 The vote of the Treaty
Indian commissioner is determined by the consensus of four Columbia
195. See Pacific Salmon Treaty: Hearings on the U.S.-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty Before the
Subcomm. on Fishery Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 105th
Cong. (1997) (testimony of Mary Beth West, chief negotiator for United States in Pacific Salmon
Treaty and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, Science & Technology) [hereinafter West
Testimony].
196. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 10.
197. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11 paras. 1-3.
198. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. II, para. 6.
199. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 585.
200. See id.
201. See Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985 § 3(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3632(a) (1994).
202. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 14. This consensus arrangement is not specified by the Treaty,
but is a feature of the U.S. implementing legislation. See 16 U.S.C. § 3632(a). This voting structure
was also agreed to by each region in the Baldrige Stipulation. See Confederated Tribes & Bands of
-the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldrige, 605 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
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River tribes and three Quinault treaty tribes, in consultation with the
Makah tribe."3 Thus, any decision by the Commission must have the
approval of both countries and all U.S. stakeholders.
The Commission is assisted by three panels, for Northern, Southern,
and Fraser River issues.2 These panels provide information and make
recommendations to the Commission. The decisions of the panels must
also have a consensus of the parties."' If the actions of one panel are
likely to affect fisheries subject to the jurisdiction of one or more other
panels, joint panel meetings are convened." 6 These decisions are also
made by consensus.0 7 Joint Technical Committees develop the scientific
data for all decisions by the Commission.2 8 These Technical Committees
also strive for consensus by seeking to develop common databases on
complex and contentious issues like run size, escapement, and catch
origin.209
3. Problems with Consensus-Based Decisions
The consensus requirement helped reconcile the range of competing
U.S. interests that had frustrated negotiations for over a decade: Indian
and non-Indian, northern Alaskan and continental United States, state
and federal, commercial and sport. Though the consensus voting process
was tedious, the support of all U.S. constituents on U.S. negotiating
positions was instrumental in securing Senate ratification. The consensus
requirement was also effective in promoting a unified negotiating
position, and the U.S. delegation sought the same mode of decision-
making for Treaty implementation.10
203. This rule of decisiomnaking was agreed to in the federal court decision on Indian fishing
rights under treaty. See Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldrige, 898
F. Supp. 1477, 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1995); see also Yanagida, supra note 106, at 585.
204. See PSC 95/96 Annual Report, supra note 29, at xi.
205. The Treaty permits the Commission to establish panels specified in Annex I of the Treaty.
See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2, para. 18. Regulatory authority for all fisheries is
reserved for the parties, except for the Fraser River Panel, which has direct management authority.
See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4, para. 7; Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6.
206. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 585.
207. See id.
208. The current Joint Technical Committees are Chinook, Chum, Coho, Northern Boundary,
Transboundary, Data Sharing, and Interceptions. See PSC 95/96 Annual Report, supra note 29, at ix.
209. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 585.
210. See id. at 585-86 as support for this paragraph.
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However, the consensus decisionmaking process can be a
"double-edged sword; the divisions that make it necessary can also make
it ineffective."2"' Consensus voting requires political momentum, giving
both Canadians and Americans any number of opportunities to thwart
decisions. Apart from a limited mechanism for resolving technical
disputes, the Treaty has no formal machinery for forcing decisions. Each
year, the Commission must resolve the many differences that treaty
negotiators chose to disguise or ignore when the Treaty was first
implemented. The Commission must also make these decisions in a
timely manner each fishing season to enable fishermen to pursue their
livelihood.2"2 The decision rule of the Commission creates a huge
potential for stalemate.
The consensus voting scheme gives each Commissioner a veto power
over every decision of the Commission. This type of voting structure is
particularly ineffective when the interests of the parties are essentially
opposed, as they are with salmon allocation. Fishing resources
apportioned to one party inevitably reduce the resources available to all
other parties.213 Furthermore, salmon intermingle during their ocean
migration, so efforts to reduce the harvest of a specific stock may involve
restrictions on fisheries throughout the region.214 Because none of the
parties will voluntarily vote to reduce its share, it is exceedingly difficult
for the Commission to forge agreement among the stakeholders.
Fish management responsibility is distributed among federal,2
1 state,216
and tribal217 authorities. Courts have even played a significant role in
fishery management in the United States, further complicating decision-
making. In 1978, a federal district court retained jurisdiction over U.S.
fishery management for certain Fraser River fisheries when state and
211. Idl at 586.
212. See id. as support for this paragraph.
213. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 6.
214. See id.
215. Federal authority extends seaward of the territorial sea. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1812 (1994).
216. State jurisdiction covers internal waters, including rivers and the territorial sea, subject to
federal preemption if state action is deemed to undercut a federal fishery management plan. See 16
U.S.C. §§ 1854-1856 (1994). Generally, the territorial sea of the United States extends three miles
from U.S. coasts. See 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994).
217. American treaty tribes have regulatory authority within their usual and accustomed fishing
grounds, subject to state preemption for purposes of conservation. See Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d
570, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1976). Such measures must be the least restrictive of Indian treaty rights
necessary to satisfy conservation requirements. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312,
333, 345-47 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
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federal authorities failed to protect Indian treaty fishing rights.2"8 The
court retained jurisdiction until 1985. Relations among U.S. stakeholders
are characterized by vigorous competition.219
The Treaty's framework gives the U.S. government little opportunity
to force a resolution of interregional conflict. The U.S. federal govern-
ment has been reluctant to usurp local authority in fishery management,
and efforts to do so have met with fierce resistance." Without the ability
to override state fishery plans, federal agencies have little influence to
resolve differences among the various constituencies." The consensus
voting structure of the Treaty regime impedes the ability of the United
States to promote its national interests in bilateral negotiations with
Canada.'
C. Successes and Failures of the Treaty
The United States and Canada had many reasons to agree to the
Treaty. The United States had three primary motivations. First, U.S.
negotiators sought to retain a consistent level of American fishing of
Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon.' Second, the United States
wanted to conserve salmon from the transboundary rivers for Alaskan
fisheries.24 Third, American officials needed to gain Canadian
cooperation to rebuild and conserve depleted chinook and coho stocks in
Washington and Oregon. 25 Canada had its own reasons for signing the
Treaty. Canadian negotiators wanted to retain more of the Fraser River
salmon runs than the fifty-percent share designated in the Fraser River
Convention. 6 Canada also sought to ensure a portion of the trans-
boundary salmon runs for its own fisheries. Finally, Canada wanted to
develop a mechanism for equitably balancing salmon interceptions
between the two countries.227
218. See United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
219. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 577-78.
220. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 14.
221. See id.
222 See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 586.
223. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 9.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 7.
227. See id.
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The Treaty has been largely successful for both parties at managing
the Fraser River runs and enhancing salmon production in the
transboundary rivers. The process has been less successful at rebuilding
southern chinook runs and balancing salmon interceptions. Each of these
areas will be examined to assess how the Treaty has affected the
management of salmon between these two countries.
1. Fraser River Salmon
The Treaty can be considered a success for both sides in the Fraser
River region. The Fraser River produces more sockeye salmon than any
other river in the world, supporting 100 distinct stocks.' Once the
allocation issue was settled by the Treaty, Canada initiated a major
rebuilding program for Fraser River sockeye salmon. 9 Sockeye runs
have increased from about five million in the early 1980s to over fifteen
million in the 1990s."O
The Treaty mechanism gave Canada a larger harvest share of the
resulting enhanced salmon runs." Canadian harvests of Fraser River
sockeye salmon rose from about four million fish in 1984 to about fifteen
million in 1993, equivalent to eighty percent of the total harvest. 2
Although the United States had relinquished its fifty-percent share of
sockeye guaranteed by the Fraser River Convention, 3 the Treaty
allowed American fisheries a total allowable catch between 1,060,000
and 3,000,000 sockeye salmon for the first four years. T4 The United
States was able to retain a twenty-percent share of this lucrative salmon
harvest, far better than it would have been granted under a strict
interpretation of the "nation of origin" principleP5 in the Law of the Sea
Convention. Thus, this agreement protected American fisheries-
particularly in Washington State-from significant and immediate
disruption.
228. See Canada Dep't ofFisheries & Oceans, supra note 33.
229. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 9.
230. See Canada Dep 't ofFisheries & Oceans, supra note 33.
231. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 4.
232. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 9.
233. See id.
234. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 4, para. 1(b).
235. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 9.
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2. Transboundary Rivers
The Treaty was also successful in improving salmon runs in the
transboundary rivers."' Transboundary rivers such as the Stikine, Taku,
and Alsek Rivers originate in Northwestern Canada and flow to the sea
through the Alaskan panhandle.237 During the years of negotiation and
conflict leading up to the Treaty, Canada had significantly increased the
catch of these stock to press its claim to fish spawned in the Canadian
portion of these rivers.238 This aggressive fishing strategy reduced the
numbers of salmon returning to spawn in these rivers and threatened
Alaskan fisheries that relied on these runs.239 The Treaty regime specified
that proportions of each river be allocated to each party, and it defined
shared conservation responsibilities.240 The agreement also encouraged
fish stock enhancement and scientific research that aided the rebuilding
efforts.24 ' The ultimate result of the Treaty was to improve fisheries for
both the United States and Canada in the transboundary areas.
3. Chinook Rebuilding
The Treaty was less successful in its efforts to rebuild the threatened
chinook stocks of Washington and Oregon.242 Chinook salmon migrate
near the coasts of Oregon, Washington, British Columbia, and Alaska,
unlike other species of salmon that swim farther out in the North Pacific
Ocean.243 The chinook's migration route passes through a sequence of
fisheries in these regions,2" which caused overharvesting of many
236. See id. at 10.
237. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 1, paras. 3, 5.
238. See Pacific Salmon Treaty: Hearings on the U.S.-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty Before the
Subcomm. on Fishery Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 105th
Cong. 57 (1997) (testimony of Jev Shelton, Alternate Commissioner for Alaska, Pacific Salmon
Commission) [hereinafter Shelton Testimony].
239. See id.
240. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 1, para. 3.
241. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 1, para. 1.
242. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 10.
243. See Canada Dep "t of Fisheries & Oceans, supra note 33.
244. For example, the Snake River fall chinook are caught in the southeast Alaska troll fishery,
the commercial salmon fishery in north-central British Columbia, the troll and sport fisheries on the
west coast of Vancouver Island and off the coast of Washington and Oregon, the commercial gillnet
fishery on the lower Columbia, and the treaty Indian fishery on the Columbia between the
Bonneville and McNary dams. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 10.
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species of salmon before the signing of the Pacific Salmon Treaty.245
Furthermore, the salmon's habitat on the Columbia and Snake Rivers has
been hurt critically by the building of eight hydroelectric dams along the
350-mile stretch.246
The Pacific Salmon Commission recognized that stocks had declined
significantly and established a rebuilding program designed to achieve
spawning escapement goals by 1998.247 The Treaty established harvest
ceilings on fisheries in Alaska and British Columbia and called for
reduced harvest rates in the Puget Sound and coastal fisheries off
Washington and Oregon. 48 After years of these restrictions, however,
only thirty-nine percent of the specific stocks were classified as above
their escapement goals in 1995 or were in the process of rebuilding.2 49
The Treaty stakeholders disagree about the need for reducing harvest
rates to achieve chinook conservation goals. One of the difficulties in
forging an agreement on chinook salmon is that the species is not
uniformly abundant throughout the region.25° In March 1999, the U.S.
government listed several types of salmon in Washington and Oregon as
either threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act."
British Columbia's chinook stocks are abundant in some rivers, less so in
others."2 Most of the Alaskan chinook stocks have already achieved their
1998 escapement goals or are in the process of rebuilding. 3
These regional differences in abundance create major differences in
attitudes toward conservation measures. Columbia River fisheries have
severely curtailed their harvests of chinook salmon in response to low
245. See Canada Dep't ofFisheries & Oceans, supra note 33.
246. See New Plan for Rescuing the Salmon, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1997, at B8.
247. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 3, para. 1.
248. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 3, para. l(d).
249. See PSC 95/96 Annual Report, supra note 29, at 67 (citing 1994 Joint Chinook Technical
Committee Ann. Rep.).
250. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 10.
251. The salmon runs listed as endangered are the upper Columbia River and spring-run chinook.
See Sam Howe, An Expensive Fish, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1999, at A14. The runs listed as threatened
are the Ozette Lake sockeye, Hood Canal summer-run chum, Columbia River chum, lower
Columbia River chinook, upper Willamette River chinook, upper Willamette River steelhead, middle
Columbia River steelhead, and Puget Sound chinook. See id. "Endangered" species are species that
are likely to become extinct; "threatened" species are species likely to become endangered in the
future. See id.
252. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 10-11.
253. See id. at 10.
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abundance of the species in their waters. 4 Due to the listing of several
species of chinook under the Endangered Species Act,255 fishermen fear
further cutbacks. In 1995, Canada attempted to conserve chinook stocks
by reducing its fishing effort by fifty percent.5 6 However, Canada has
been reluctant to further reduce its harvest of chinook unless it receives
compensation. This compensation could take the form of reduced
interceptions in Southeast Alaska or a lower Fraser River sockeye and
pink salmon harvest in Washington. 7 Alaska, on the other hand, sees
little reason to reduce its chinook harvest under the state's "abundance-
based management. '  Alaska claims that a reduction in its fishery
would violate the Treaty's mandate against unduly disrupting an existing
fishery.259 These conflicting views came to a head in 1995 when the
treaty tribes and the fish management departments of Washington and
British Columbia sought to enjoin Alaska's chinook fishery.2"
The conservation and allocation of chinook salmon remains a hotly
debated and contentious issue between the parties. The Treaty principles
and processes have been unable thus far to resolve the issues surrounding
chinook salmon.
4. Salmon Interceptions
The Treaty's greatest failure is that it has been unable to balance
salmon interceptions equitably between the United States and Canada.
26
'
This failure is primarily responsible for the breakdown in the Pacific
Salmon Commission process since 1993.262 Several years ago, a
distinguished panel of experts convened by the National Academy of
Sciences found that international interceptions of salmon would
undermine even the most successful habitat restoration efforts unless
fisheries were more carefully managed.263
254. See id. at 11.
255. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
256. See Canada Dep 't of Fisheries & Oceans, supra note 33.
257. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 11.
258. Id,
259. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. III, para. 3(b).
260. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 11.
261. See id. at 10.
262. See Shelton Testimony, supra note 238, at 60-62.
263. See Charles F. Gauvin, Viewpoint: If Trend Continues, Canada, U.S. Won't Have Fish to
Fight Over, News Trib. (Tacoma), Nov. 23, 1997, at B 11.
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Figure 1: Commercial Fishery Catch by Weight,
Value, Species, and Region 2"
Commercial Fishery Catch Interceptions
Total Avg. Price Landed As Percent As Percent of
Catch PerPound Value of Species A Species'
(1000 lbs.) 1990_91 265 ($1000) Catch in Landed ValueArea
Chinook 5,183 $2.26 11,702 54.8% 7.2%
Coho 15,720 $1.13 17,717 13.7% 2.7%
Southeast Sockeye 12,901 $1.23 15,822 43.1% 7.7%
Alaska Chum 21,643 $0.50 10,713 4.0% 0.5%
Pink 131,370 $0.25 32,843 6.3% 2.3%
All Species 186,817 $ 0.48 88,797 10.5% 20.4%
Chinook 10,696 $1.51 16,162 51.9% 5.3%
Coho 21,042 $0.98 20,569 31.8% 4.1%
British Sockeye 66,278 $1.31 86,728 0.3% 0.2%
Columbia Chum 29,272 $ 0.49 14,364 3.5% 0.3%
Pink 66,189 $0.33 21,911 17.6% 2.4%
All Species 193,477 S 0.83 159,734 13.0% 12.3%
Chinook 8,484 $1.83 15,527 7.1% 2.0%
Coho 9,886 $0.94 9,292 7.5% 1.3%
Washington Sockeye 12,123 $1.80 21,822 101.1%* 40.1%and
Oregon Chum 8,232 $0.62 5,104 19.8% 1.8%
Pink 7,065 $0.46 3,250 84.0% 5.0%
All Species 45,790 $1.20 54,994 46.3% 50.2%
Chinook 24,363 $1.78 43,366 36.2% 5.2%
Coho 46,647 $1.02 47,580 21.0% 3.3%
Tota f Sockeye 91,302 $1.36 124,171 18.2% 7.5%
At Chum 59,148 $0.51 30,165 5.9% 0.6%
A Pink 204,624 $0.28 57,295 11.5% 2.2%
All Species 426,084 S 0.71 302,578 14,6% 18.7%
* The percent of interceptions for Washington and Oregon sockeye of over 100% may be
due to discrepancies in interception estimates versus official landing records. See
Huppert, supra note 25, at 20 n.4.
264. This table is a reproduction of a table that originally appeared in Huppert, supra note 25, at
20 tbl.1 (footnotes omitted).
265. See Id. "Average Price Per Pound" is also known as the "ex vessel value," meaning the
amount paid to the fishing vessel operator at dockside.
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American interceptions have steadily increased due to expanded
harvests in Southeast Alaska, while Canadian interceptions have declined
due to decreased abundance of salmon from Washington and Oregon.266
In 1985, the United States intercepted 2.4 million more salmon than did
Canada, according to Canadian sources.267 By 1996, the net interception
by U.S. fisheries more than doubled to 5.3 million salmon, which Canada
estimates to have an annual wholesale value of about C$70 million. 68
The accumulated imbalance since 1985 is approximately 35 million fish
worth approximately C$500 million.269
A "bubble" chart depicts the above information more concisely.270
Figure 2 shows three different variables: size of the catch, percent of
interceptions, and value of the salmon. The size of the "bubble"
represents the overall size of the harvest in pounds. Large harvests like
the Alaska pink and B.C. sockeye appear as large circles, while smaller
runs such as the Washington pink and the Alaska chinook are smaller
circles. The percentage of interceptions is graphed on the left-right axis.
Most of the salmon caught are not interceptions, and therefore appear on
the left side of the chart. Washington sockeye and pink salmon harvests
contain high numbers of intercepted fish, and are located on the right
side of the chart. The value of the salmon is graphed on the vertical axis,
with the most valuable types of salmon placed near the top of the graph.
Chinook and sockeye are worth more per pound and are higher on the
chart than the less-valued coho, chum, and pink salmon catch.27'
There are vast differences among the three Treaty regions in
interception levels. In the 1990-91 fishing season for the entire Treaty
region, almost fifteen percent of the catch by landed weight were
interceptions. The intercept rate was almost nineteen percent, if
measured by landed price value. Washington and Oregon are the most
dependent on interceptions with over forty-six percent of its catch
measured by weight and over fifty percent of its catch measured by value
consisting of Canadian fish.2 72 These interceptions are primarily Fraser
266. See id. at 11-12.
267. See Canada Dep't of Fisheries & Oceans, supra note 33.
268. See id. At the exchange rate of 1.407 (as of June 24, 1999), the U.S. equivalent is $47.6
million.
269. See id. At the exchange rate listed above, the U.S. equivalent is $340 million.
270. See infra Figure 2.
271. Washington and Oregon's pink salmon harvests are primarily interceptions from British
Columbia. These low value interceptions are located in the bottom right hand comer of the graph.
272. See id.
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River sockeye and pink salmon.273 Southeast Alaska is the next most
dependent on interceptions, representing only 10.5% of its total catch but
over 20% of the total value. Interceptions of chinook and sockeye salmon
from Washington and British Columbia are a highly valuable share of
Alaska's fishery. British Columbia is the least dependent on intercep-
tions, with only thirteen percent of its catch and just over twelve percent
of its value deriving from interceptions. However, the province's
fisheries off Vancouver Island take a large portion of Washington's
threatened chinook and coho stocks.
Figure 2: Commercial Catch Value and Interception Rates of
Pacific Salmon Treaty Regions by Species, 1990-91274
Native 4 10 Interceptions
$2A0
High $2.20 AK Chinook
Val igh-Value High-Valu
$2.00 WA Chinook Native Fish Interptions$1.80 C) (
$1.60 C Chk WA Sockeye
S$140 BC AK Sockeye0
$1.20 Se A Size of Circle Represents Total
.0 Catch In Pounds= $100 0 0 1
$0.80 AK 0DWA Coho 00,00bs.
Cu BCChum BC Coho
$0.60 WA Chum WA Pink
$0.40 0
BC Pink
$0.20
Low-Value 7Low.Valuei7
$0.00, Native Fish Interceptions
Low
Value 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Interceptions as a Percent of Species Catch (Midpoint of U.S. and Canadian Estimates)
F0 Southeast Alaska 0 British Columbia 0 Washington / Oregon
The areas of the chart are divided into four major categories: low-
value native fish, high-value native fish, high-value interceptions, and
low-value interceptions.275 Most of the commercial catches are of low-
value native fish, in the bottom left comer of the chart. These catches
include the Alaska pink, British Columbia pink, and all coho and chum
273. See id.
274. Sources for data are the same as for Figure 1. See supra notes 264-65.
275. Sources for this paragraph are the same as for Figure 1. See supra notes 264-65.
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harvests. Higher-value harvests of predominately native-origin salmon
are located in the upper left quadrant of the graph and include the British
Columbia sockeye, the Washington chinook, and the Alaska sockeye
fisheries. The upper right comer of the graph represents harvests of
highly valued fish that contain over fifty percent interceptions, such as
the British Columbia chinook, Alaska chinook,276 and the Washington
sockeye runs. The final category is the low-value interceptions. The only
harvest in this category is the Washington pink salmon fishery. The
diagram suggests that higher-valued salmon species tend to be more
frequently intercepted.
The balance of interceptions has been exacerbated by diverging trends
in salmon abundance among the regions. Alaskan and Washington
fisheries intercept Canadian salmon, but Canada intercepts significant
amounts of salmon from Washington and Oregon chinook and coho
stocks only. As salmon populations have declined in Washington and
Oregon, Canadians have intercepted fewer American fish. During this
time, salmon populations in Southeast Alaska and British Columbia have
been very abundant, leading to increased American interceptions of
Canadian stocks. If the Alaskan stocks remain abundant while the
Washington and Oregon runs remain depressed, there will be a
continuing imbalance in interceptions unless fishing practices change
dramatically.'
Canada has become increasingly dissatisfied with this growing
inequity in interceptions. In the annual Pacific Salmon Commission
negotiations, Canada has insisted that the imbalance in interceptions be
remedied soon.278 Although the southern fisheries have been willing to
reduce their harvests of Canadian stocks to conserve their depleted runs,
Alaskan fish managers have shown little desire to reduce harvest rates.
Alaska gains very little from the Treaty, because salmon from all regions
migrate through Alaskan waters, while Canadian fisheries do not
intercept Alaskan salmon. In the absence of a negotiated treaty, Alaska
has the opportunity to fish both Canadian and other regions' salmon
stocks with relative impunity.279
276. Alaska's troll fishery for chinook is one of the most contentious fisheries because it is
composed predominately of interceptions. Over half of the harvested chinook is from British
Columbia and another 30% is from Washington and Oregon. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 14.
277. See id. at 11-12, 15 as support for this paragraph.
278. See id.
279. See id at 14-15 as support for this paragraph.
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Both countries agree that interceptions are a problem, but they
disagree on the number and value of salmon intercepted by each country.
Calculating interceptions is not an exact science. Interceptions are
estimated from the proportion of tagged fish recovered from each
fishery, 280 and from biological studies of scale patterns and parasites in
the salmon's brain.81 These statistical samples are then combined with
knowledge of the abundance of stocks during the fishing season to
calculate interceptions.8 2 Experts can reasonably differ on these
statistical extrapolations, and the two countries have widely divergent
interception estimates. Although the Pacific Salmon Commission's Joint
Committee on Interceptions attempts to resolve these differences, these
disagreements over the level of interceptions detract from negotiations
on how to correct the imbalance." s
Voluminous and detailed data exist on salmon catches and
escapements, but the two sides see entirely different numbers.2I Each
country can point to statistics supporting its viewpoint, and each side has
clung tenaciously to its interpretation of the equity principle.2 5 Canadian
negotiators display complicated charts of "total salmon interceptions"
and demand that the United States acknowledge the imbalance between
the two nations.26 American negotiators dispute the Canadian figures
and claim that U.S. interceptions are much lower and are the result of the
abundance of certain salmon stocks.287
280. See Id at 12.
281. See Williams & Gilmore, supra note 144.
282. See id.
283. See id
284. See Louv, supra note 193.
285. See West Testimony, supra note 195.
286. See Louv, supra-note 193.
287. See Shelton Testimony, supra note 238.
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Figure 3: Canadian and American Estimates of Net
U.S. Salmon Interceptions
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The Native American representatives on both sides of the border are
frustrated by the conflict over interceptions, claiming that these debates
are unproductive and divert attention away from efforts to increase
salmon runs for all of the parties. As Fred Fortier, chair of the British
Columbia Aboriginal Fish Commission, said, "If we get caught up in
trying to count fish as they run over the border, we'll never resolve
this."289 The tribes have focused instead on improving salmon habitat.
These efforts, however, would force changes in urban development,
commercial agriculture, hydroelectric dams, and the timber industries.29°
D. Conclusions About the Treaty
The Pacific Salmon Treaty made possible eight years in which both
countries agreed on fishing regimes and undertook efforts to address
mutual conservation problems. The Treaty established two basic
principles--conservation and equity-and several key factors to guide
international fishery decisions. Although the Treaty was successful in
rebuilding Fraser River and transboundary river salmon runs, it failed to
288. This figure is a reproduction of a figure that originally appeared in Huppert, supra note 25, at
27 fig.6.
289. Louv, supra note 193.
290. See id.
Vol. 74:605, 1999
Pacific Salmon Treaty
enhance the depleted southern chinook stocks and balance interceptions
between the two countries.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY
Despite the high hopes that accompanied the Pacific Salmon Treaty's
signing, the Treaty failed to end the salmon war. The Treaty did establish
the basic framework for coordinating salmon management between the
United States and Canada. However, the Treaty failed to define
adequately the principles of conservation and equity and did not specify
how those principles would be implemented to allocate salmon harvests.
Furthermore, the process for reaching agreements within -the Pacific
Salmon Commission was fatally flawed in that a single party could
unilaterally undermine progress on negotiated settlements.
These flaws in the Treaty's structure resulted in the breakdown of
salmon coordination between the parties. Once the initial term of the
Treaty's Annex IV expired, the Pacific Salmon Commission was charged
with renegotiating annual catch limits and fishery management
guidelines for each party.29' However, the Commission could not agree
on an international salmon management plan due to problems with the
Treaty's consensus-based negotiation process and the lack of an effective
dispute resolution mechanism. Since 1993, American and Canadian
interests have repeatedly failed to develop a comprehensive agreement
on salmon management under the Pacific Salmon Treaty.
The lack of a negotiated salmon allocation has led to increasing
frustration and discord between the parties. Some regions such as Alaska
took advantage of the failed negotiations by increasing their harvests of
Canadian salmon. Canada sought to pressure American negotiators back
to the table by overfishing U.S. stocks. As frustrations mounted, the
salmon war spilled over to other aspects of the countries' relationship.2 92
The impasse has led to several international incidents such as the
imposition of transit fees, the detention of American fishing vessels, and
the blockade of an Alaskan ferry. British Columbia's Premier Glen Clark
threatened to close a base important to the U.S. Navy. There has also
been a spate of lawsuits in this most recent flare-up of the salmon war,
alleging violations of the Treaty and overfishing. Thus, the Pacific
291. See PSC 95/96 Annual Report, supra note 29, at xi-xii.
292. See Joel Connelly, Salmon Envoys Push for Deal Now; 'The Fish Are Losing,' Ruckelshaus
Says, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 13, 1998, at Al.
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Salmon Treaty did not settle the salmon wars, but rather enabled
intermittent cease-fires interspersed with intense flare-ups.293
A. No Clear Definition of Treaty Principles
Although the Pacific Salmon Treaty enshrined the conservation and
equity principles to be used in resolving the salmon dispute, the Treaty
did not adequately define these principles. A former Canadian commis-
sioner described the Treaty as a "bare-boned document with no agree-
ment on even simple concepts."2' Treaty negotiators left it to the Pacific
Salmon Commission to work out how to apply these principles. In recent
years, that has not proved possible. Each country has its own
interpretation of the equity and conservation principles, and each
believes strongly that the other country's interpretation is wrong. This
lack of agreement on the Treaty's fundamental principles has derailed the
process.
1. Conservation Principle
Both countries generally agree on the concept of conservation, but
have approached conservation issues in very different ways. These
regional differences in conservation approaches have led to wide
regional variances in salmon abundance.
For example, Washington has placed several dams along the
Columbia River and its tributaries. These dams have impeded salmon
migration and damaged critical salmon habitat, leading to an overall
decline in the abundance of salmon from these waters.295 Several salmon
species from Washington and Oregon have been listed as endangered or
threatened.296 Washington's Department of Fisheries has responded with
enhanced hatchery programs.297 Canada, however, has resisted efforts to
293. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 1.
294. Pipkin Testimony, supra note 129.
295. See Jonathan Brincknan, Attempts to Save Salmon Turn into Upstream Battle, Plain Dealer
(Cleveland), Aug. 13, 1997, at 17A.
296. See supra note 251.
297. See Brinckman, supra note 295.
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put dams in its rivers.29 This restraint has been rewarded with increased
abundance of salmon.'
One of the major stumbling blocks for salmon conservation efforts is
the failure to resolve issues of equity. Some regions have refused to
restrict their harvest of salmon in order to conserve the stocks of other
areas.3" Conservation measures have often been subordinated to issues
of allocation, as regions refuse to cooperate on conservation unless they
receive compensation in return.3"'
2. Equity Principle
The Treaty's equity principle states that each party should reap
benefits proportionate to the salmon that originate in its waters.3"
However, the parties fundamentally disagree on how to implement that
principle. The parties have not reached a consensus on how to calculate
the benefits of the salmon. 3 As shown in Figure 3, the parties disagree
even on how many interceptions are currently being taken by their
respective fisheries.
Each country has its own interpretation of the equity principle.
Canadians argue that the country of origin should receive more than
credit for its conservation costs. They believe that they have rights to
compensation for all U.S. interceptions of Canadian fish.3" This concept
has been likened to state ownership of salmon spawned in the state's
waters.3 5 The Canadian government sought a complicated "accounting"
298. See Kim Murphy, Fish Wars Have Created a Real Stink Between the U.S. and Canada;
While Negotiations for a New Salmon Treaty Are Underway, Americans Are Catching Flakfor Their
Latest Harvest, L.A. Times, July 30, 1997, at AS.
299. See ial
300. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 11.
301. See id.
302. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. III, para. 1(b).
303. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 12-13.
304. Canada argued in the Law of the Sea Convention that "[o]nly the State of origin can protect
and culture salmon and effectively manage the fishery. [Habitat maintenance, enhancement and
management] can be carried out only by the State in whose rivers the salmon breed-the State of
origin." Canada: Working Paper on the Special Case of Salmon-The Most Important Anadromous
Species, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/ C.2/L.81 (1974), reprinted in 3 Third U.N. Conference on the Law
of the Sea, Official Records 240 (1975) ("submitted to provide the basis in fact and in equity for the
development of an appropriate regime" on salmon conservation and management).
305. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 589.
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formula to quantify the value of interceptions.0 6 This type of formula
could be used to restrict American fisheries that harvest Canadian origin
fish, such as the lucrative Fraser River fisheries.3"7
Brian Tobin, Canada's Minister of Fisheries, has stated that equity
means each nation should have "the opportunity to harvest the fish
produced in its rivers, or failing that, to harvest an equal amount of the
other nation's fish."30 8 However, assuring that each country receives the
same number of intercepted fish would ignore species, size, scarcity, and
market price. Thus, the Canadian interpretation of equity would count a
two-pound pink salmon as equivalent to a twenty-pound chinook salmon,
even though the chinook is fifty times more valuable.0 9
The United States has rejected the Canadian accounting process,
dismissing this interpretation of equity as simplistic "bean-counting.""31
The Americans argue that the equity formulation establishes no exclusive
rights for compensation in the country of origin.3 ' The United States
believes that the equity principle should recognize the contributions of all
states in maintaining salmon habitat.31 2 Furthermore, the rights of states
whose fishermen historically have depended on the resource also
constrain the equity principle.31 3 Because of this fundamental difference
in interpretation, the equity principle has yet to be implemented in
practice.
International legal principles support a more collective approach to
equity in fisheries allocation.3 14 The 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea recognized that both the country of origin and coastal states have
interests in conserving anadromous species like salmon.31 The country
of origin has "the primary interest in and responsibility for such
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. Huppert, supra note 25, at 12.
309. See id.
310. 1992-1993 Pacific Salmon Comm 'n Ann. Rep. 16 (1993) (stating United States' position at
post-1992 fishing season meeting of Commission).
311. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 589.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. These principles emerged during the Third U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which
occurred at the same time as the Treaty negotiations. The Law of the Sea Convention was concluded
in 1982, before the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty was signed.
315. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 63, para. 1.
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stocks, 31 6 but the state shares this interest when salmon enter the internal
waters, territorial sea, or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of coastal
states.317 If fish stocks intermingle in the EEZs of two states,
international law directs both states to seek agreement on "the measures
necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and development of
such stocks."31" In attempting to catch fish that originated in its own
waters, each nation will incidentally harvest some salmon that originated
in the waters of the other.319 With intermingled stocks, conservation is
possible only if both states accept that a certain level of interceptions is
inevitable. International law recognizes that both upstream and coastal
states contribute to the maturation of fish.320 The equity principle should
provide incentives for both the country of origin and neighboring states
to invest in habitat maintenance and conservation.32'
The need to prevent the disruption of existing fisheries also limits the
equity principle. Both the Treaty and the Law of the Sea Convention
express this limitation. The Treaty required the Commission to recognize
"the desirability in most cases of avoiding undue disruption of existing
fisheries,' 3" some with long-settled expectations and historic claims. The
Law of the Sea requires the country of origin to "co-operate in
minimizing economic dislocation in such other States fishing these
stocks, taking into account the normal catch and the mode of operations
of such States, and all the areas in which such fishing has occurred. '' 23
The equity principle, therefore, cannot be interpreted to require the
closing of a state's historic fisheries.
A more-nuanced version of interception accounting requires agree-
ment on the value of an intercepted fish. However, the value of a
316. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 66, para. 1.
317. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 66, para. 4.
318. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 63, para. 1.
319. This approach to interceptions is adopted in the Treaty itself for the boundary area fisheries
off southeast Alaska. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, Annex IV, ch. 1.
320. See Yanagida, supra note 106, at 590.
321. See id.
322. Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 1, art. III, para. 3(b).
323. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 66, para. 3(b). See also Law of the Sea
Convention, supra note 76, art. 66, para. 3(a), which prohibits high seas salmon fishing seaward of
the exclusive economic zone, "except in cases where this provision would result in economic
dislocation." This provision was adopted to accommodate the interests of states like Japan, whose
fishermen harvest salmon on the high seas. See Japan: Draft Article on Anadromous Species, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.46 (1974), reprinted in 3 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, Official Records 221 (1975).
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captured salmon varies "by species, quality of meat, time of the year,
stage in its life cycle when caught, type of gear used to catch it, market
demand and currency fluctuations."'324 So far, Commissioners have been
unable to agree on the proper scientific and economic means for
estimating these biological and economic variables.
One promising approach for resolving the equity issue is the "singular
pricing" approach.325 Under this system, each nation uses common
economic methodologies to assign economic values to salmon caught in
its fisheries. The parties could use these estimates of value to track
changes in equity balance over time. Chahges in the balance of economic
value in favor of one nation could prompt changes in fishing regimes or
compensation to bring about the desired equity. Although this approach
would specify the value of salmon caught by each country, the two
nations would still have to agree on a level of interception values that it
considers equitable.326 A strict interpretation of the equity principle
would mean that interceptions must be balanced numerically and would
require the United States to significantly reduce its interceptions of
Canadian fish or compensate Canada monetarily for the excess salmon
harvested by American fisheries.327
A resolution of the equity principle issue could guide the allocation of
salmon harvests, which would in turn guide annual fishery negoti-
ations.328 An agreement on the meaning of the principle would allow both
countries to realize the full potential of the Treaty, helping to conserve
salmon and enhance production in both countries.329 It would also enable
the development of long-term fishing regimes to conserve and rebuild
stocks to optimum production levels.330
324. Yanagida, supra note 106, at 591.
325. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 13 n.16.
326. See id.
327. See id. at 13 as support for this paragraph.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See id.
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B. Failure to Agree on Allocation
The last comprehensive fishing arrangement negotiated through the
Pacific Salmon Commission occurred in 1992.?"' Since then, the parties
to the Treaty have been unable to reach a long-term agreement on
disputed fisheries issues; there have been only interim agreements
covering specific species or limited geographic areas.332 The lack of a
comprehensive agreement on salmon management forced Canadian and
American fish management agencies to manage catches in their
jurisdictions with limited international cooperation. This lack of
agreement led to a free-for-all by each of the parties, as each sought to
catch as many fish as possible to prevent the other side from benefiting
from the breakdown in talks. Each side has accused the other of violating
the principles of the Treaty, overfishing, and jeopardizing future salmon
runs.
333
Because of frustration with the process, the Canadians have refused to
participate in the Commission process established by the Treaty. Instead,
negotiations have taken place through the use of special negotiators in
1994, nonbinding mediation in 1995, stakeholder negotiations in the
spring of 1996, and the appointment of high-level envoys in 1997.334 All
of these forums failed to achieve consensus on a comprehensive fishery
regime.3
35
1. Canadian-Imposed Fines on Inside Passage, and Canadian Fish
War in 1994
After the breakdown of talks before the 1994 fishing season, Canadian
authorities attempted to increase the pressure on U.S. fishing interests
through two distinct strategies. The first involved imposing a transit fee
on American ships traveling through Canadian waters on their way to
331. See Dee Norton, Canadian Calls for Harmony on Salmon, Seattle Times, Jan. 22, 1998, at
B3.
332. See Young Press Release, supra note 5. The parties have made interim agreements in some
fishing seasons, covering only specific species originating from certain rivers. See, e.g., PSC 95/96
Annual Report, supra note 29, at iii (explaining 1995 interim fishing arrangements for Fraser River
sockeye and pink salmon and commitments for southern coho and chum fisheries).
333. See, e.g., Benton Testimony, supra note 178. British Columbia Premier Glen Clark charged
that the United States has "been overfishing with impunity." Louv, supra note 193.
334. See Young Press Release, supra note 5.
335. See id.
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Alaskan fishing grounds.336 The second strategy was to wage a Canadian
fish war against U.S. salmon stocks to force the Americans to
negotiate.337
In 1994, Canada imposed a "transit fee" of C$1500 (US$1050) on all
fishing vessels moving up the Inside Passage to Alaska, a 750-mile route
between Vancouver Island and the Canadian mainland.33 Prior to that
regulation, American fishing boats had an explicit exemption under
Canadian law permitting travel through the Inside Passage without a
license or permission to enter Canadian waters.339 This waterway
provides a vital route for U.S. fishing boats traveling between Alaska and
the lower forty-eight states.34' Avoiding the Inside Passage would
involve sailing west of Vancouver Island on the dangerous heavy seas of
the Pacific Ocean.34'
The United States protested the fee as violating the International Law
of the Sea guaranteeing the innocent right of passage to vessels through a
country's territorial waters.342 The Law of the Sea Convention defines
territorial waters as those extending twelve miles off a nation's coast.3 43
336. "A United States fishing vessel may, without the authority of a license, pass through the
Canadian fisheries waters known as the 'Inside Passage' on the west coast of Canada if it complies
with the conditions described in subsection 15(2)." Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, C.R.C.
ch. 413, § 17 (1978), amended by SOR/85-527, 1985 C. Gaz. 2719, 2725 § 13 (Can.). The primary
condition in section 15(2) is to have a fishing vessel stow its gear below deck or otherwise restrict
the gear's availability for fishing. See C.R.C. ch. 413, § 15(2) (1978).
337. In 1994, Fisheries Minister Brian Tobin announced that Canada would fish aggressively in
order to "maximize disruption" to U.S. fisheries. Canada relentlessly pursued an aggressive fishing
regime in its West Coast of Vancouver Island (WCVI) coho and chinook fisheries with the publicly
stated purpose of increasing pressure on the United States to resolve the "equity" issue. Canada's
aggressive fishing policy in WCVI and Georgia Straits fisheries came at the expense of its own
chinook and coho stocks. See, e.g., Benton Testimony, supra note 178.
338. See David Crary, U.S.-Canada Squabble Erupts over Usage ofthe Inside Passage, Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 8, 1996, at A6.
339. See C.R.C. ch. 413, § 17, amended by SOR/85-257, 1985 C. Gaz. 2719, 2725 § 13 (Can.).
340. See Sandi Doughton, The View from the Boats: Issues in the U.S.-Canada Salmon War; A
Fine Kettle offish; International Fight Also Has Aspects of Interstate Battle, News Trib. (Tacoma),
July 3, 1994, atAl.
341. See id.
342. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 17; see also United States: President's
Transmittal ofthe United Nations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea and the Agreement Relating to
the Implementation ofPart XI to the U.S. Senate with Commentary, 34 I.L.M. 1393, 1396 (1995)
(explaining that Law of the Sea Convention sets forth "navigation regimes of innocent passage in the
territorial sea, transit passage in straits used for international navigation, and archipelagic sea lanes
passage").
343. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 2. Article 2 describes the territorial sea as
"a belt of ocean which is measured seaward from the baseline of the coastal State and subject to its
Pacific Salmon Treaty
Canada argued that the Inside Passage is not part of Canada's territorial
waters but is an internal waterway.3" The right of innocent passage does
not extend to a country's iiternal waters.345 Canadian officials held that
the fines were legal under Article 26 of the Law of the Sea
Convention.346 Canada viewed the U.S. protest as an affront to Canada's
sovereign right to control access to its own waters.347 Canada eventually
suspended the transit fee after Vice President Gore promised further
high-level negotiations on the salmon allocation issue.34
This transit fee cost American fishermen a total of about $300,000,
which the U.S. government reimbursed.349 Congress passed an
amendment to the Fisherman's Protection Act in 1995 urging the State
Department to recover the fines collected by Canada.350 The bill also
warned that the United States will not tolerate any future action that
would "impede or otherwise restrict" U.S. boats' right to use the
passage.3 ' Thus far, Canada has refused to compensate the United States
for the fees collected during this period.
sovereignty. This sovereignty is exercised subject to the Convention and other rules of international
law relating to innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage and protection of the
marine environment" United States: President's Transmittal of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI to the U.S. Senate
with Commentary, 34 LL.M. at 1401.
344. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 8, para. 1. Article 8 defines internal
waters as "the waters on the landward side of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured." United States: President's Transmittal of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI to the U.S. Senate with
Commentary, 34 I.L.M. at 1401.
345. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 52.
346. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 76, art. 26.
347. Dennis Brown, a Canadian Commissioner with the Pacific Salmon Commission stated,
"'[W]e really have to stand up for ourselves as a country, or we are going to lose it all. We are
taking on the world's most powerful country-you have to be realistic here. But dammit somebody's
got to take a tough line."' Colin Nickerson, Canada-U.S. Fight Looms over Salmon, Boston Globe,
July 9, 1995, at 2.
348. See Canada and U.S. to Resume Stalled Salmon Talks, Reuters World Serv., July 2, 1994
(crediting telephone talks on Saturday, July 2, 1994 between Al Gore and Canadian Fisheries
Minister Brian Tobin with causing return to negotiations).
349. See Carey Goldberg, U.S. and Canada Baiting Each Other over Pacific Salmon Catches,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 8, 1997, at A6.
350. See S. 2243, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 3817, 103d Cong. (1994). Both bills were passed to
amend the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1977 (1994). See also Dave
Birkland et al., Canadian Toll Imposes "Quiet Time" on U.S. Fishermen, Seattle Times, June 16,
1994, at Al.
351. Crary, supra note 338.
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Also in 1994, Canada's Minister of Fisheries, Brian Tobin, announced
a fish war to "cause maximum disruption to the U.S. fleet" '352 and force
the Americans back to the bargaining table. Canada increased its salmon
harvests off Vancouver Island in an attempt to preempt the Washington
State sockeye salmon fishery in the Puget Sound.353 Many observers felt
the aggressive fishing strategy eventually harmed Canada's critical
Fraser River salmon conservation program.
354
2. Interim Agreement for 1995
The 1995 fishing season began without an Annex IV agreement.
Commission officials reached an interim arrangement for Fraser River
sockeye and pink salmon in July of that year. The parties also agreed to
conduct fisheries for southern chum and coho "in a manner that reflects
past Treaty arrangements. 355 Chinook fisheries, however, remained "an
unresolved and contentious issue" as both Washington State and British
Columbia sought to reduce Alaska's harvest of this species.356
The Endangered Species Act severely constrained fishing for
Columbia and Snake River spring chinook in 1995. The Act closed
Columbia River sport fishery and all nontribal commercial fisheries,
except for two twelve-hour periods in mid-October to target relatively
healthy runs of late coho. Low forecasts for spring chinook caused
reductions even in tribal ceremonial and subsistence fishing. Despite
these reductions and closures, the numbers of fish returning to spawn
were the lowest on record for some species.357
Alaska, however, refused to cooperate with the other regions in their
management of chinook fisheries. 358 Alaskan fishermen continued to
harvest chinook salmon in large numbers, the vast majority of which
originated in other regions.35 9 Rather than reduce its chinook salmon
352. Gerry Merrigan, Medred Fishing Wrong Side of Border for Villain, Anchorage Daily News,
Sept. 25, 1997, at BS.
353. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 4.
354. See id.
355. PSC 95/96 Annual Report, supra note 29, at xii.
356. Id.
357. See id. at 36 as support for this paragraph.
358. See Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldrige, 898 F. Supp.
1477, 1483-85 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
359. It is estimated that almost 55% of the chinook caught in these fisheries are interceptions from
Canada, Washington, and Oregon. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 20 tbl.1. This estimate is based on
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harvest, Alaska announced the opening of a third fishery to target these
stocks.3" Alaska justified its salmon management plan as "abundance-
based management.""51 This fish management strategy adjusts the catch
of fish in response to the strength of their runs. 62 Alaska claimed that
because the number of chinook in its waters had increased, it should be
able to increase its harvest of these salmon. Canada's Minister of
Fisheries Brian Tobin disagreed, calling Alaska's chinook fishery a
"frenzy of greed" designed by "shortsighted and self-interested fishery
managers." '363 This flagrant disregard for the principles of the Treaty and
the conservation requirements of these stocks led to a lawsuit in U.S.
federal courts.
3. Confederated Tribes v. Baldrige II: Good Faith Requirement
In September 1995, Northwest Indians sought a preliminary injunction
prohibiting Alaska from authorizing fishing of chinook salmon runs for
the remainder of the year.3" Washington State's Department of Fish and
Wildlife and Canada's Department of Fisheries and Oceans joined the
tribes' suit.365 Alaska's Department of Fish and Wildlife planned to
harvest what the tribes considered an excessive amount of chinook
salmon, the majority of which were fish from Washington, Oregon, and
British Columbia. Indian tribes asked the court to enjoin Alaska from
continuing this chinook fishery.366
Judge Rothstein of the Western District of Washington granted the
injunction, holding that Alaska had not implemented its new plan in good
faith and had violated the principles of the Pacific Salmon Treaty and the
the midpoint of U.S. and Canadian interception estimates published by the Pacific Salmon
Commission. See id.
360. See Confederated Tribes, 898 F. Supp. at 1483.
361. See id. at 1484-85.
362. Alaska's 1995 proposal relied upon an in-season abundance index, rather than the pre-season
estimates used by the model developed by the Commission's Chinook Technical Committee (CTC).
Alaska developed this in-season abundance-based model because it believes that the CTC's model
underestimates actual abundance, resulting in catch ceilings that were lower than necessary. Alaska's
proposed 1995 Plan would have allowed a catch of 230,000 chinook salmon, rather than the 140,000
allowable catch under the CTC model. See id at 1485.
363. Lisa Busch, Scientific Dispute at Center of Legal Battle over Salmon Catch: Chinook
Salmon Catch in Alaska, 269 Science 1507 (1995).
364. Confederated Tribes, 898 F. Supp. at 1479.
365. See id.
366. See id.
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Baldrige Stipulation.367 The court had jurisdiction over the matter
because the district court in the previous Baldrige decision explicitly
retained jurisdiction to enforce the stipulation, which obligated the
parties to work in furtherance of its purposes.368
Under the Treaty, the United States and Canada agreed to implement a
rebuilding program for chinook salmon fisheries based on a catch ceiling
approach.369 Under this approach, a catch ceiling would be maintained
while rebuilding the stock of chinook salmon.370 Thus the percentage of
available fish caught-the stock exploitation rate-would decline as
stocks were rebuilt.37" ' The parties had expressly rejected a harvest rate
alternative that called for lower catches early in the program but would
have permitted catches to increase as stocks increased.372 Although
Alaska's fishery department had moved to a harvest rate method, the
state was still obliged to follow the Treaty principles in its chinook
harvest.373 Thus, the Treaty required the state to restrain its harvest of
chinook even though the parties had not reached a negotiated
agreement.374
The Chinook Technical Committee of the Pacific Salmon Commission
estimated the allowable catch of chinook for Alaska would total 140,000
chinook in 1995."75 At the time of the injunction hearing, Alaska had
already caught approximately 175,000 chinook salmon. 76 Because the
court order occurred late in the 1995 fishing season, the decision had
only a small impact on Alaska's chinook harvest. 77 However, the action
signals a more active role for the courts in arbitrating disputes among the
Treaty parties in requiring that the parties work in good faith toward
resolving their differences.
367. See id. at 1488-89.
368. See id. at 1484.
369. See id.
370. See id.
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. See id. at 1490.
374. See id. at 1489.
375. See id. at 1485.
376. See id. at 1484.
377. On August 11, 1995, Judge Barbara Rothstein issued a temporary injunction that halted
further chinook fishing in Alaska. The injunction was sustained on September 7, and the chinook
fishery did not reopen for the remainder of the summer season, except for a recreational exemption
of 2000 chinook salmon. See PSC 95/96 Annual Report, supra note 29, at 33.
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4. Third Party Mediation Fails in 1996
In October 1995, Canada and the United States entered into mediation,
led by former Ambassador Chris Beeby of New Zealand.378 After
working with both parties for several months, Ambassador Beeby
proposed an accounting formula that would implement the equity
obligations of the Treaty and balance the interests of the United States
and Canada. One of the major difficulties in resolving the equity dispute
was establishing a value for intercepted salmon. Beeby proposed a
formula using the domestic wholesale value of fish (in price per pound)
to establish the value of the catch by each country.3 79 Once the value of
each sides' salmon catch was determined accurately, the equity principle
could be implemented to require a balance in these values.
This formula would have likely forced the United States to curtail its
fishing dramatically or pay Canada cash as compensation. Canada
welcomed Beeby's proposal as "a vindication of what we've always been
saying, and it comes from a third party, which carries a certain moral
weight. 3 80 The United States, however, rejected the recommendations
and refused to comment on any aspect of Beeby's report.38 American
negotiators dismissed the idea of using a formula to calculate the dollar
value of salmon as an irrelevant "bean-counting exercise" that has no
relationship to the real world.382 American experts claimed that a political
negotiation rather than an independent analysis or scientific formula
represented the only chance for a resolution to the Treaty impasse.383
5. Stakeholder Discussions Fail in 1996-1997
In February of 1997, the parties tried to resolve salmon management
issues through stakeholder talks.3  In these discussions, the parties
378. Mr. Beeby, a career diplomat for 30 years, is a judge with the World Trade Organization. See
Danny Westneat, Secret Fishing Report Sides with Canada, Seattle Times, May 31, 1997, at Al.
379. See id.
380. Id. (quoting GeoffMeggs, spokesman for British Columbia Premier Glen Clark).
381. Seeid.
382. See id.
383. Beeby's recommendations were supposed to be released to the public only if all sides agreed.
See id.
384. See Opinion, Arbitration the Best Way to Settle Fish Tif, Fin. Post (Toronto), July 12, 1997,
at 14.
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affected by the Pacific Salmon Treaty in the North and South regions
sought to negotiate the management and allocation of salmon.3" 5
These stakeholder negotiations failed. None of the parties would agree
to reduce significantly its own share of salmon.386 With the consensus-
style voting process of the Commission, and without agreement on a
formula to implement the equity principle, these stakeholder discussions
eventually dissolved into finger pointing and frustration.387
C. The Salmon War Erupts in 1997
In 1997, the simmering dispute between the United States and Canada
over fishing rights erupted into a full-scale "salmon war."3 As talks
between the parties broke down for the fourth straight year, both
countries escalated the level of fishing interceptions while accusing the
other side of failing to negotiate.8 9 The salmon dispute eventually spilled
over to unrelated areas of the U.S.-Canada relationship, affecting
passenger ferries, threatening military base closures, and generating a
spate of lawsuits."'
1. Stakeholder Negotiation with Government Oversight
In 1997, U.S. negotiators presented a proposal to Canada for a
stakeholder process that both governments would oversee. The proposal
called for fishermen in the region to hammer out an agreement on issues
that affected them directly and to make recommendations to the chief
negotiators. Canada accepted this proposal, but only if government-to-
government negotiations settled issues not resolved by the
stakeholders.39'
385. See Kathleen Kenna, Canada-U.S. Salmon War Gets Uglier: Barbs Fly Across the Border as
Both Sides Accuse Each Other of Lying on the Issue, Toronto Star, July 11, 1997, at A16 (estimating
that there are about 32 distinct U.S. stakeholders).
386. See Editorial, Letting Cooler Heads Prevail in Salmon Talks, Seattle Times, July 27, 1997, at
B6 (stating that 1997 talks broke down for lack of senior decisionmaking power by U.S. negotiator
and "unwillingness by Alaskans to negotiate away a sockeye catch they could grab by default").
387. See West Testimony, supra note 195, at 57.
388. See Brandt, supra note 385.
389. See West Testimony, supra note 195, at 57.
390. See infra notes 411-55 and accompanying text.
391. See West Testimony, supra note 195, at 55.
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This stakeholder process did result in several creative and far-reaching
proposals, including a reduction in the U.S. nontribal commercial
sockeye fishery through a voluntary buy-out of forty percent of the
fishery, subject to congressional appropriation of the necessary funding.
However, the governments could not agree on allocation and conser-
vation of the sockeye and coho fisheries. One of the imajor stumbling
blocks in the negotiation was protection for declining coho stocks, which
was one of the major objectives for the United States in the negotiation.
Canada refused to agree to U.S. proposals for long-term conservation and
rebuilding of coho stocks, and the talks broke down.392
The two sides proposed a framework for future talks on chinook and
agreed to exercise coordinated management on other stocks similar to the
1996 arrangements. During the government-to-government talks, the two
sides began to discuss arrangements to bridge the countries' differences
on equity. The parties also sought to establish conservation and
allocation systems for individual fisheries, which could resolve these
issues for a relatively long time period.393
2. "Canada First" Fishing Strategy
As the 1997 fishing season again started without. agreement, Canada
began a new strategy to force the Americans back to the negotiating
table. This plan, dubbed "Canada First," attempted to win the fish war by
catching large numbers of Fraser River sockeye salmon before they
reached U.S. waters. 94 This policy was an effort to force the U.S.
government to come to terms on Treaty agreements by exerting heavy
pressure on "American fish."3 95 As British Columbia Premier Clark
explained, the fishing plan represented a means "to ensure that the
Americans are worse off this year than they would be without a
treaty. 39
6
One can see the impact of this strategy by assessing the Fraser River
salmon runs. The parties had failed to reach an allocation agreement with
respect to the Fraser River sockeye. When treaty negotiations broke
down, Canada offered the United States about seventeen percent of the
392. See id. as support for this paragraph.
393. See id. as support for this paragraph.
394. See Benton Testimony, supra note 178.
395. See Merrigan, supra note 352.
396. Connelly, supra note 292.
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Fraser River salmon catch. American negotiators held out for 21.1%.
Under the Canada First policy, Canadian fishermen caught more than
three million of the Fraser-bound sockeye salmon, about ten times more
than their American counterparts. Thus, by holding out for an additional
four percent of this lucrative ran, American fishermen received only nine
percent of the total harvest.397
Alaska did not reduce its harvest of Canadian stocks in response to
Canada's increase in fishing catches. Instead, Alaskans netted 315,000
Canadian sockeye along with the 2,000,000 pinks and other species
caught during its pink harvest season. The Alaskan sockeye harvest in
1997 represented a threefold increase from the average of 120,000
Canadian sockeye intercepted by Alaskan fishermen in the previous three
years.
398
United States fishing officials claimed that their fisheries targeted
Alaska's abundant stocks of pink salmon and not Canadian sockeyes.
Alaska's Pacific Salmon Commissioner David Benton claimed that the
increase in interceptions was due to the higher levels of pink salmon
rather than an intentional targeting of Canadian stocks. But the
Canadians doubted that the increased number of interceptions was an
accident. "When a sockeye is six times more valuable than the pink,
you'd have to believe the sun comes up in the West to believe they're not
targeting those fish for their nets," said David Anderson, the Fisheries
Minister of Canada.399
The fishing strategies of Canada and Alaska, combined with natural
conditions, severely limited the number of sockeye salmon returning to
the Fraser River. Canadian fishery officials had calculated the catch to
allow 500,000 sockeye to escape upstream to spawn, but high water
levels in the Fraser River allowed only about 100,000 to reach the
spawning grounds in the Stuart River. Some experts believe that these
policies threatened critical salmon stocks in both Canada and
Washington. David Ellis, a Canadian fisheries analyst, wrote that "the
Canada-first fishing plan.., is actually a 'scorched earth' fishing policy
because although it will kill many American coho, it will also kill many
coho of Canadian origin." Coho are endangered in both U.S. and
Canadian rivers.4 °°
397. See id. as support for this paragraph.
398. See id. as support for this paragraph.
399. See id. as support for this paragraph.
400. See id. as support for this paragraph.
Vol. 74:605, 1999
Pacific Salmon Treaty
3. Canada Tightens Maritime Enforcement
To increase pressure on American fishermen to settle the Treaty
impasse, Canadian officials tightened enforcement of maritime
regulations.4"1 In 1997, Canada passed a law that requires all boats
traveling through Canadian waters to check in by radio with the
Canadian Coast Guard and stow their fishing gear below decks. 40 2 Strict
enforcement of this "hall-in" rule began shortly after the collapse of the
salmon negotiations.4 3 Canadian authorities detained four American
boats traveling through the Inner Passage from Washington to Alaska for
violating this law. 4 The skippers were each fined C$300 (US$215) and
allowed to continue.' 5
Canadian authorities also arrested two tribal fishermen from
Washington on illegal fishing charges. Canadian officials seized their
boats, nets, and catch near Victoria, British Columbia, claiming the men
were illegally fishing sockeye salmon. The two men from the Makah
tribe were fined $4000 each and were released.40 6
The seizure of U.S. vessels angered American officials, who
characterized the actions of the Canadian as "gunboat diplomacy." 40 7 A
State Department spokesman said the detention of American fishermen
"created an atmosphere inimical to progress in these talks and is
401. See Jane Hadley & Jack Hopkins, Seized Boats Could Go Free Today; Some U.S. Fishermen
See a PowerPlay by Canada, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 27, 1997, at Al.
402. See Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-33, § 4 (forbidding fishing by
foreign vessels in Canadian waters), §§ 7-16 (authorizing inspections, arrests, seizures, and
forfeitures) (Can.); see also Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, C.R.C. ch. 413, § 12, amended
by SOR/96-390, s. I(F), s. 2 (Can.). Those regulations state, in part, that "the master of a foreign
fishing vessel entering Canadian fisheries waters shall ... notify a protection officer or Regional
Director-General of the name, flag state, location, route and destination of the vessel and of the
circumstances under which it entered Canadian fisheries waters [and] shall, while in those waters,
ensure that all fishing gear on board the vessel is stowed below deck... placed where it is not
readily available for fishing; and at the request of a protection officer, proceed to a location indicated
by the officer for the purpose of carrying out an inspection of the vessel." Coastal Fisheries
Protection Regulations, C.R.C. ch. 413, § 12, amended by SOR/96-390, s. I(F), s. 2 (Can.).
403. See Tim Klass, "Salmon War" Blamed on Election, Columbian, May 28, 1997.
404. See Goldberg, supra note 349.
405. See Carey Goldberg, Fishing Talks and Fighting Words, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1997, at A16.
406. See Men Fined for Fishing Canadian Waters, States News Briefs, July 22, 1997, as support
for this paragraph.
407. Helen Jung, U.S. Cuts Fish Talks with Canada, Anchorage Daily News, May 28, 1997, at IA
(quoting Alaska Gov. Tony Knowles: "What the Canadian federal government has chosen to do is to
utilize the Alaska fishermen as political hostages .... Alaskans will not stand for gunboat
diplomacy.").
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unhelpful to efforts to find a solution to the Pacific salmon dispute. 40 8
Senator Frank Murkowski, suggested a Coast Guard or Navy escort for
other fishing vessels."° The Canadian strategy backfired, however, when
U.S. negotiators refused to resume scheduled salmon talks.410
4. British Columbia Threatens to Close U.S. Base
Canadian authorities searched for additional leverage to force the
Americans back to the negotiating table for the 1997 fishing season.
British Columbia Premier Clark threatened to evict the United States
from a submarine testing facility and torpedo range at Nanoose Bay.
Unfortunately for Premier Clark, both the U.S. and Canadian govern-
ments reacted strongly against his threat."' This expansion of the scope
of the dispute to nonfishing areas poses a greater risk to Canada, as
Canada depends more on the United States than the United States
depends on Canada.
The Canadian Forces Maritime Experimental and Test Ranges
(CFMETR) at Nanoose Bay is located on Winchelsea Island in Georgia
Strait, just north of the city of Nanaimo. Although owned and operated
by the Canadian military, the U.S. Navy uses CFMETR as a testing
ground for torpedoes, sonar, and other high-tech naval equipment used in
anti-submarine warfare. The onshore buildings sit on federal property,
but the torpedo testing range occupies seabed owned by the province and
leased to the Canadian military. Clark threatened to cancel the seabed
lease, which would have rendered the facility essentially useless.4 12
The Canadian federal government intervened to prevent the closure of
the base.4"3 The federal government sought an injunction from the B.C.
408. Tim Klass, U.S. Puts off Salmon Talks with Canada over Seizures/4th American Vessel Is
Detained as B.C. Premier, Gov. Locke Meet, News Trib. (Tacoma), May 28, 1997, at B1 (quoting
Nicholas Bums).
409. See Timothy Egan, Fish War Divides Cascadia: Fight over Salmon Incites Nationalism,
Anchorage Daily News, Sept. 14, 1997, at B1.
410. See Jung, supra note 407.
411. The Canadian government sued the province of British Columbia for breach of contract
involving the lease for the base. Alaska Senator Ted Stevens, Chair of the Appropriations
Committee, demanded a review of all U.S. funding for joint defense programs because Canada
threatened to renege on its NATO obligations. See Kathleen Kenna, B.C. Premier's Salmon Threat
Creates Diplomatic Tidal Wave; His Ultimatum Embarrasses U.S., Canadian Officials, Toronto
Star, June 28, 1997, at AI4.
412. See id. as support for this paragraph.
413. See id.
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Supreme Court to block the cancellation of the seabed lease agree-
ment.414 Canadian government officials claimed that Premier Clark
overstepped his authority because foreign policy and national security
fall under federal jurisdiction."' If the Premier persists in his efforts to
close the facility, federal officials could expropriate the range due to the
critical role the base plays in Canadian and American national security.
4 16
It is unlikely that Premier Clark will follow through on his threat, and has
said privately to his aide that he regrets bringing up the issue. 17
5. Canadian Fishermen Blockade Alaskan Ferry
The salmon war flared again in July 1997 when Canadian fishermen
blockaded the Alaskan ferry Malaspina in British Columbia's Prince
Rupert Sound for three days. 8 Canadian fishermen surrounded the ferry,
seeking to draw attention to their assertion that Alaskan fishermen were
catching too many "Canadian" salmon.4"9 Specifically, Canada accused
Alaska of overfishing, maximizing catches unwarranted by the current
abundance of pink and red salmon, and instituting a new intercept fishery
in violation of the Pacific Salmon Treaty.420
The stunt succeeded in drawing media attention as the newspapers and
television crews focused on the plight of 328 stranded tourists and
travelers.42 1 The burning of an American flag-replayed repeatedly by
major news programs-inflamed passions on both sides of the border.42
414. See Ottawa Looks to End Torpedo Base Threat, United Press Int'l, Aug. 14, 1997.
415. See id.
416. See Anderson, supra note 412.
417. See id.
418. See Darcy Henton, Salmon Stakes: B.C. Fishermen, Fearing for the Survival of Their
Livelihood in the Face of an Ambitious U.S. Fishing Fleet, Are Proving a Powder Keg in
International Salmon Fishing, Toronto Star, July 27, 1997, at F1; see also Blockade Ends; Ferry
Sails; Fishermen Quit Prince Rupert Protest, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 22, 1997, at Al.
419. See id
420. See Merrigan, supra note 352.
421. See, e.g., Alaska Retaliates in Salmon Conflict, San Diego Union-Trib., July 24, 1997, at
A16; Timothy Egan, Salmon War in Northwest Spurs Wish for Good Fences, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12,
1997, at Al; Henton, supra note 418; U.S.-Canada Conflict Takes Another Turn, Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, July 24, 1997, at 4.
422. Ironically, the fisherman who initiated the flag burning had both Canadian and American
citizenship. See Egan, supra note 421.
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The blockade drew immediate protests from the United States. 423 The
State Department lodged an official complaint with the Canadian
government, asking them to control the actions of the fishermen.424 In
addition, the U.S. Senate voted eighty-one to nineteen to condemn
Canada for failing to bring a swift end to the blockade. 425 The nonbinding
resolution urges sanctions against Canada in the event of a recurrence.426
A British Columbia provincial court ordered the fishing boats to
dissolve the blockade, and Royal Canadian Mounted Police told the
fishermen to leave or face penalties.427 The blockade finally ended after
the Canadian Minister of Fisheries, David Anderson, called for the
release of the ferry. The Fishery Minister urged the fishermen to give up
the blockade so that the Pacific salmon negotiations could continue.428 A
judge in Vancouver, British Columbia, has barred further blockades.429
After the release of the Malaspina, the Alaskan ferry system canceled
remaining ferry service to Prince Rupert and rerouted its ferries to avoid
this town in northern British Columbia.43° In turn, this cutoff of
transportation caused the city's tourism trade to suffer.431 Ferry service
resumed only after high-level talks between Canadian federal officials
and Alaska.432
Alaska sued 200 Canadian boat owners who participated in the
blockade for C$2.8 million compensation for the disruption of service in
British Columbia.433 The controversial Premier of British Columbia, Glen
423. See Senate Condemns Canada over Blockade, Columbian, July 24, 1997.
424. See id.
425. See id.
426. See Rob Taylor, Canada and U.S. Take Steps to Resolve the "Salmon War", Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, July 24, 1997, at Al.
427. See id.
428. See Blockade Ends; Ferry Sails; Fishermen Quit Prince Rupert Protest, Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, July 22, 1997, at Al.
429. See Stephen Ward, American Court Action Heats up Salmon War: Alaska Wins Injunction
Against Further Ferry Blockades, Toronto Star, July 29, 1997, at Al.
430. See Larry Bleiberg, Casualty of War; Salmon Battle Has Put Prince Rupert's Charms in the
Shade, Anchorage Daily News, Sept. 21, 1997, at K1.
431. See id.
432. British Columbia Premier Clark was conspicuously excluded from these international
negotiations.
433. See Threat Stirs Salmon Row: Alaska Seeks Seizure of Vessels in Ferry Blockade, Toronto
Star, Aug. 28, 1997, at Al (noting that defendants also received notice of possible seizures of their
vessels); see also Maureen Clark, Salmon Agreement by March; Knowles Upbeat on Fish, Not
Prince Rupert Ferry, Anchorage Daily News, Aug. 1, 1997, at B7.
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Clark, offered to pay the legal costs of the fishermen.434 Clark's support
earned him the respect and loyalty of Canadian fishermen, but also the
increased ire of Canadian federal officials. The Canadian national
government refused to intervene on the fishermen's behalf, stating that
the government will not "support them financially for illegal acts of civil
disobedience." '435
Alaska dropped the suit against the roughly 200 fishermen after
reaching an agreement with the Canadian government and the City of
Prince Rupert. In that agreement, the Canadian government agreed to pay
nearly C$3 million436 for marketing campaigns to encourage tourism in
Alaska and British Columbia and to reduce docking fees for Alaska
ferries. The Canadian government did not admit liability in the matter.
Canadian fishermen must agree to comply with a permanent court
injunction barring similar actions and will drop counterclaims against
Alaska totaling about C$15 million.437
6. Suits and Countersuits
British Columbia's Premier Clark filed a lawsuit on September 8,
1997, in U.S. District Court in Seattle seeking damages for American
overfishing of salmon. Others joined the suit, including the United
Fishermen and Allied Workers Union, a branch of the Canadian Auto
Workers, and individuals from British Columbia's commercial,
recreational, and Indian fisheries. The named defendants included the
U.S. federal government, Washington, Alaska, U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, and Commerce Secretary William Daley. The suit
alleged that the U.S. federal government has failed to curb fishing by
Alaskan fisherman in excess of the Treaty limits and in violation of
Treaty principles. The lawsuit sought damages estimated at C$325
million to compensate fishermen who could not harvest their share of
salmon.438
434. See Ward, supra note 429.
435. British Columbia Considers Court Action over Fish Treaty, Anchorage Daily News, Sept. 4,
1997 (quoting David Anderson, Canadian Federal Fisheries Minister).
436. The U.S. equivalent was approximately $2 million.
437. See Melissa Moore, Feny Deal Requires OK of Fishermen, Anchorage Daily News, Jan. 23,
1998, at B1.
438. See Tim Klass, Court Throws out B.C. Salmon Suit, Anchorage Daily News, Jan. 31, 1998,
at D8, as support for this' paragraph.
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The suit was founded on the alleged disproportionate catch by
Alaskan fishermen, in violation of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management Act43 9 and statutes implementing the Pacific Salmon
Treaty in 1985.440 Clark claimed that Alaskans caught 572,000 Canadian
sockeye, four times the limit established by the Treaty.44' Alaskan
officials responded that Alaskan fishermen only incidentally intercepted
Canadian fish while fishing for Alaskan pink salmon."2 They also noted
that the agreement limiting Alaska's Canadian sockeye catch had
expired. 3
Premier Clark stated that he hoped the lawsuit would provide leverage
to force the United States into serious treaty talks."4 The Canadian
federal government did not support Clark in his efforts." 5 Clark
responded by calling Canada's federal government "treasonous" for
failing to support his efforts on behalf of Canadian fishermen." 6 Clark
has even created an extraordinary advertising campaign in which he
accused Americans of trying to kill the great salmon bounty." 7 Gary
Locke, Washington's governor and a target of Clark's ads, retorted that
Clark is "willing to grandstand this issue and fish the salmon to
extinction if that's what it takes .... That won't save a single fish."" 8
Judge John Coughenour dismissed the case on January 30, 1998."
The judge stated that a demanding corrective action on the fishery
"would impose a foreign policy decision on the executive branch."45
The judge held that damage claims against the United States are based on
Treaty provisions that expired years ago, and those against Washington
439. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (1994).
440. See Klass, supra note 438.
441. See Rob Taylor, B.C. Leader Sues U.S., State, over Salmon Pact: Clark Alleges Violations,
Hopes to Spur Treaty Talks, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 9, 1997, at Al.
442. See id. It should be noted, however, that sockeye salmon are much more valuable than pink
salmon. For instance, in 1990-1991 the average "ex vessel" price per pound of pink salmon in
southeast Alaska was $0.25, while the price per pound of sockeye was $1.23. See Huppert, supra
note 25, at 20.
443. See Taylor, supra note 441.
444. See id.
445. See Joel Connelly, Salmon War Sees Flip-Flop in Roles, Oregonian, Sept. 21, 1997, at A27.
446. See id.
447. See Egan, supra note 409.
448. Id
449. See Klass, supra note 438.
450. Id.
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and Alaska are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution.45 *
The opinion stated that the Treaty "is only a framework" for negotiating
harvest allocations and fishing regimes that might have the force of
law.452 Coughenour noted that Iinitial Treaty catch allocations have
expired and the so-called "equity principle" remains undefined and
subject to further negotiations.453 Thus, the Treaty merely represents "an
agreement to agree," and is thereby unenforceable without a negotiated
annual settlement. 4 "The court cannot apply principles of statutory
construction to a statute that has not been finished." '455
7. High-Level Envoys Seek Solution
United States and Canadian officials appointed a special team of
envoys to discuss restarting talks between the two countries.456 President
Clinton appointed William Ruckelshaus, former head of the
Environmental Protection Agency, to assess the issue and reinvigorate
the talks."' Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien appointed Dr. David
Strangway, former B.C. University President, to serve as the Canadian
facilitator in this process4 8
These high-level appointees issued a report on January 12, 1998."59
During the press conference announcing their findings, U.S. envoy
William Ruckelshaus explained the need for dramatic change. "Right
now, with no rules, the fish are losing," he said.4" The report gave four
recommendations for resolving the Treaty impasse:
451. See id.
452. Id
453. See id.
454. Id
455. Id.
456. See Ruckelshaus to Work on Fishing Dispute, United Press Int'l, July 25, 1997.
457. See id.; see also Ross Anderson, B.C. Premier Predicts Fish Talks Will Fail-Ruckelshaus
WillRepresent U.S., Seattle Times, July 25, 1997, at B1.
458. See Ruckeshaus to Work on Fishing Dispute, supra note 456; see also West Testimony,
supra note 195, at 54.
459. See Envoys: Governments Must Settle Fish Wars, News Trib. (Tacoma), Jan. 13, 1998, at B3.
460. Connelly, supra note 292.
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1. The stakeholder process should not be reconvened.4 61 This
process-where commercial, tribal, and recreational
fisheries interests negotiated-was broken beyond repair.462
2. The governments should adopt interim measures for two
years through direct government-to-government talks.463
3. During the two-year period, the governments should develop
a practical framework for Article III. 46
4. Governments should review the Pacific Salmon Commission
and dedicate themselves to making it functional.465
While these recommendations are a step toward a solution, the report
does not provide the means for effectively resolving the salmon crisis.
The failure of the two representatives to come up with a solution left
officials in both countries wondering whether the Treaty would have to
be jettisoned altogether, leaving the two nations to start from scratch.466
D. Negotiating Positions of Each Side
1. Abundance-Based Management or Equity First
The American position places conservation as the first priority.
American fish management officials believe that harvests in each fishery
should reflect abundance of the fish stocks. This principle of adjusting
annual harvests to account for the abundance of the predominant stock is
a well-established practice in salmon management. With this approach,
annual harvest levels respond to variations in abundance of the targeted
stocks in order to achieve a maximum sustainable yield. Because
Canadian and American salmon intermingle in ocean fisheries, a higher
harvest rate due to abundant stocks would probably result in more
interceptions of the less abundant stocks as well.467
461. See Rep. Don Young, Congressman Young Reacts to Ruckelshaus-Strangway Report on
Pacific Salmon (Jan. 12, 1998) (press release) (on file with author).
462. See Editorial, Moving Stalled Fish Talks, Seattle Times, Jan. 13, 1998, at B4.
463. See id.; Young, supra note 461.
464. See Young, supra note 461.
465. See id.
466. See Carole Landry, U.S., Canada Fail in Latest Bid to Settle Pacific Salmon Dispute, Agence
France-Presse, Jan. 12, 1998.
467. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 15 as support for this paragraph.
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Alaskan officials, in particular, have argued that abundance-based
management not only achieves conservation, but also works equitably in
the long run. For this claim to be valid, however, there must be some
means of balancing the interception deficits and surpluses over time.
When excess interceptions occur, the harvest regime must be modified to
permit excess interceptions by the other party. This method would
achieve a balance of interceptions over the long run. The Pacific Salmon
Treaty recognizes the need to accommodate annual fluctuations by
establishing five-year catch objectives and requiring "pay-backs" when
harvests exceed agreed levels. However, the parties have not yet worked
out a comprehensive rule for achieving this interception balance.468
Canada also places a high priority on conservation, but it views the
"abundance-based" approach as avoiding direct discussion of the equity
issue.469 Washington has offered to reduce its catch of Fraser River
salmon in return for reduced Canadian catch of coho and chinook off
Vancouver Island.47 In contrast, Alaska stubbornly refused to reduce its
harvest rates, and Canada refused to make a deal involving only the
southern fisheries.47'
Canada reasonably argues that it should reap the benefits of taking
good care of fish habitat.472 John Radisovic, British Columbia's leader of
the fishermen's union, stated that Canada "didn't put power dams on our
rivers. The Americans chose to put dams from stem to stem, and now
they're looking toward us and saying, 'Well, we dammed up our rivers,
but now we'd like your fish."'
2. Stakeholder Decisionmaking or Government-to-Government
Negotiation
The United States has insisted on stakeholder-based negotiations to
resolve the impasse over the Pacific Salmon Treaty.474 However, the
parties have employed this type of negotiation several times and it has
468. See id. as support for this paragraph.
469. See id.
470. See id. at 16.
471. See id.
472. See Kim Murphy, Canadians Steam About U.S. "Salmon War", Oregonian, Aug. 3, 1997, at A22.
473. Id.
474. See West Testimony, supra note 195, at 56-57.
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consistently failed to resolve the underlying issues involved in the
Treaty.
475
Political infighting between the various factions in the U.S. fishery
often gets very heated. During the recent stakeholder negotiations, some
representatives expressed fear for their personal safety.476 They claimed
that their homes and cars were in danger of being firebombed if they
were perceived as having "given in" to Canada.4 77 Several also noted that
they would be able to reap greater immediate benefits in the absence of a
Treaty than with a negotiated peace.4 78 Canada has grown frustrated with
the stakeholder talks, arguing that these negotiations with the United
States were like debating with several different countries.479
E. Conclusions About Treaty Problems
Problems with the Treaty's process have resulted in years of frus-
tration and fury over salmon allocation. This frustration has erupted
recently into a full-scale salmon war between the United States and
Canada, with battles fought in fishing boats, in blockades, and in
courtrooms. The war has escalated to the point that it has jeopardized
other areas of the U.S.-Canada relationship.
The United States and Canada may scrap the Treaty altogether unless
new long-term solutions are developed. Policy makers have hinted that
the Treaty process itself may be in jeopardy if the current problems are
not resolved soon.480 The chief negotiator for the United States, Mary
Beth West,481 told a Congressional subcommittee that a failure in the
talks could cause some to question "whether the Treaty is still useful." '482
The parties must work to resolve the problems with the Pacific Salmon
Treaty, such as the definition of equity and the means for allocating
salmon, before breaking the Treaty process irretrievably. Alternatively,
475. See Editorial, Moving Stalled Fish Talks, Seattle Times, Jan. 13, 1998, at B4.
476. See Gerry Kristianson, Editorial, U.S.-Canada Salmon Treaty Negotiations Tread Rough
Waters, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 5, 1997, at A15. Mr. Kristianson represented sport fishermen
in the 1997 Pacific Salmon Treaty stakeholder negotiations.
477. See id.
478. See id.
479. See Huppert, supra note 25, at 14.
480. See West Testimony, supra note 195, at 57.
481. See id. at 55.
482. Id.
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the parties can devise a new Treaty mechanism that fixes the problems
with the current Treaty.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE SALMON WAR
There is nothing more dangerous to manage than the creation of a
new order of things.... [T]he initiator has the enmity of all who
would profit by the preservation of the old institution, and mere
lukewarm defenders of those who would gain by the new ones.48 3
Continued international confrontation will inevitably lead to the
extinction of several species of Pacific salmon. Without an enduring and
equitable solution to issues of salmon conservation and allocation, each
side will continue to harvest more than the resource can sustain. All
parties must work together and develop lasting compromises to assure
that salmon continue to swim the waters of the North Pacific Ocean.
The causes of the Pacific salmon war are complex, and will require
solutions that recognize the various interrelationships between politics,
economics, and biology. Any settlement in the dispute must give priority
to conservation needs while also resolving allocation issues for fisheries
with dissimilar characteristics and disparate management opportu-
nities.4 The solution must also account for salmon's economic, cultural,
and social implications, and recognize the legal rights of Indian tribes on
both sides of the border.4 85 Furthermore, Canadians have insisted that a
solution must address not only future allocations but also allegations of
past "equity imbalances." '486 Effectively solving the problem of Treaty
implementation will require a system for long-term cooperation between
the parties, moving away from annual negotiations and disputes.
Any solution to this most recent crisis over salmon must meet some
basic criteria. The first priority must be to assure the continued
abundance of salmon. Both nations must make conservation paramount,
with a particular focus on preventing further declines in the overfished
coho and chinook salmon runs.487 Any fishing agreement must limit the
harvests of depleted runs, particularly endangered runs such as the Snake
483. Tipton, supra note 10, at 380 (quoting Niccolo Machiavelli).
484. See Piplin Testimony, supra note 129.
485. See id.
486. See id.
487. See Gauvin, supra note 263.
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River chinook.488 Furthermore, an agreement should provide each
country with incentives for preserving the critical habitat that salmon
require for their continued vitality.
Accepting conservation as a paramount goal, scientists must set the
optimal limits on the annual harvest to create a sustainable population.
Harvest limits must be grounded in science, not politics. Once both
nations accept conservation as a paramount goal, the nations must agree
to respect the best available scientific information in setting harvest
levels.489 Fishery managers must be isolated from political pressures that
have driven them to allow rampant overfishing. 90
Allocation between competing regions must be equitable. Any
solution must devise a means for equitably allocating the salmon catch in
a way agreeable to the various parties. Given the equity principle
established in the Treaty, the catch allocated to each country should be
based solely on the health of its rivers' salmon population, and not on the
party's negotiating strength. It may be possible, however, to remove the
domestic allocation squabbles from the international negotiating table.
International agreements could determine the division of the harvest
between the two countries based on scientific and legal principles. Only
then should West Coast fishery "stakeholders" have a role in deciding
who gets to catch how many fish.49 ' Once the allocation is made between
Canadian and American interests, the American team would determine
the allotment of salmon to be caught by each of the regions-Alaska,
Washington, and Oregon-and by each of the stakeholders-
commercial, recreational, and tribal fisherman.
Any solution must resolve issues for the long term. The controversy
between the United States and Canada has lurched from crisis to crisis in
recent years, because of the dispute over fundamental principles
enshrined in the Pacific Salmon Treaty. The controversy with Canada
"requires a solution that puts in place a system for long-term
cooperation." '492 To achieve a long-term cooperative solution, both
parties must agree on a clear definition of the principles governing their
fishery decisions. A longer-term solution should also solve the problem
of annual negotiation gamesmanship that has held up recent fishing
488. See id.
489. See id.
490. See id.
491. See Connelly, supra note 445.
492. Pipkin Testimony, supra note 129.
Vol. 74:605, 1999
Pacific Salmon Treaty
seasons. It is extraordinarily difficult to negotiate all of the intricate
details involved in international salmon management. It is even more
difficult to negotiate these issues each year within the tight time frame
required by the beginning of fishing season.493 The special envoys'
recommendation for a two-year interim agreement may be a step in the
right direction.
A. Model of Salmon Allocation
To better understand the underlying dynamics of international salmon
management, this Article sets forth a simple two-country model. By
examining the workings of this model, one can see that resolving
problems of interceptions and salmon allocation depends critically on the
nature of the intermingling stocks. This model demonstrates that the
management of fisheries in one region dramatically influences the
availability of fish in other regions. One can also explore how different
solutions may result in different outcomes for conservation and
allocation of the salmon resource.
This paper examines three different variations in the basic two-
country model. The first variation involves two countries whose fish
stocks stay within the country of origin's Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ). The second variation examines the problems that result when one
country's fish stocks swim exclusively in the other country's EEZ. The
third model-the one most relevant to the North Pacific fishery-
explores the issues arising from the intermingling of fish stocks in both
countries' EEZs.
1. Fish Swim Only in One Country's EEZ
In the first simple two-country model, fish swim only within the
country of origin's EEZ. In this situation, there is little need for
international coordination and management, because each country has
the incentive to harvest its fish resources at a rate that maximizes the
sustainable yield into the future. Domestic management could devise
means for allocating the resource among fishermen without the need for
international coordination and cooperation. Furthermore, each country
will make the optimal investment in conservation for its own rivers,
because it will receive all of the benefits of this investment.
493. See West Testimony, supra note 195.
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2. Fish Swim Only in Another Country's EEZ
In the second model, the fish have distinctly different migration
patterns. The fish in this example swim only in the neighboring country's
EEZ, returning to their country of origin only to spawn. With this type of
migration pattern, each country would still have incentives to harvest at
maximum sustainable yields because the fish return to the harvest
grounds each year. However, the countries have no incentives to
conserve fish habitat on land, because these benefits accrue only to one's
neighbor and not to the conserving country. Under the optimal solution
in this situation, the two nations would agree to a desired level of
conservation, perhaps with one nation paying the other to conserve fish-
spawning habitat.
3. Fish Intermingle in Two Countries' EEZs
In the third model, the fish intermingle in the two countries' EEZs
before returning to spawn in their country of origin. This type of
migration pattern would reduce incentives for conservation because those
who sacrifice to conserve would not reap the benefits of such conser-
vation. Furthermore, neither party would have incentives to limit its
harvest to maximum sustainable yields without assurances from the other
party that it would also restrict its harvests. Without agreement between
the two countries, the resulting "race to the resource"4 94 would lead to
overfishing and overutilization of the fishery. This type of situation
requires an international cooperative solution. For instance, each country
could compensate the other for catches of its neighbor's fish.
B. Possible Solutions
At least four different approaches could resolve the current salmon
dispute between the United States and Canada. These include binding
arbitration, an "or else" provision in the Treaty, compensation for
interceptions, and individual transferable quotas (ITQs).
494. Tipton, supra note 10, at 382.
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1. Binding Arbitration
As one possible solution to the current impasse, the parties could
submit the issues to an international dispute resolution or arbitration
board. The Treaty could be revised to create an arbitration process for
issues not resolved through the Pacific Salmon Commission each year.
This process should bind each party to assure that at every harvest season
there are effective limitations on each country's salmon harvest.
Canada has repeatedly sought to have the allocation and equity issues
of the Treaty resolved by binding arbitration.495 The parties did attempt to
use a mediator in 1996, but that effort was unsuccessful and the
mediator's report was sealed.4 96 The Americans resisted the efforts at
binding arbitration, arguing that such a process would exclude U.S. state
governments and stakeholders from any agreement.497 Furthermore,
American officials claim that the Treaty would have to be changed, or a
vote of Congress taken, to allow for any agreement not obtained through
consensus of the U.S. Section of the Pacific Salmon Commission.498
According to James Pipkin, U.S. special negotiator and federal
Commissioner on the Pacific Salmon Commission, any arbitration would
essentially amend the Treaty and would require approval of two-thirds of
the U.S. Senate.4'
If the parties add an arbitration clause to the Pacific Salmon Treaty, it
should further clarify and define the means for allocating salmon
between the parties. To avoid the exclusion of U.S. stakeholders from the
process, an arbitrator could have the authority to determine only the
harvest limits for each nation. Once the arbitrator determined the
allocation between Canadian and American interests, the American team
would have to determine the allotment between each of the many U.S.
495. See, e.g., Thomas Walkom, Net Loss: More Than Livelihoods Are at Stake in the Salmon
War; We Could Lose Our Sovereignty, Toronto Star, Dec. 21, 1997, at Fl; Anthony Willson-Smith
et al., Under Friendly Fire: Land Mines and Fish Test Canada-U.S. Relations, Maclean's, Sept. 29,
1997, at 24.
496. See Salmon War Spills out of Hearing: Canadian Wants Binding Arbitration; Alaskan Wants
No Politicians, Anchorage Daily News, Sept. 18, 1997, at Fl.
497. See Adam Zagorin & Dianne Rinehart, Kettle of Fish; The Drawn-Out Salmon Dispute
Turns into a Standoff That Leaves Ottawa and Washington Scrambling for Ways to Keep a Bad
Situation from Getting Worse, Time (Canadian Edition), Aug. 4, 1997, at 20.
498. See Willson-Smith et al., supra note 495, at 24.
499. See No Treaty Likely This Summer in U.S.-Canada Salmon War, Negotiator Says,
Columbian, June 27, 1997.
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stakeholders-the three states, Indian tribes, and professional and sport
fisherman.
2. "Or Else" Provision to Encourage Negotiation
Under another alternative, the Treaty could establish a default
mechanism that would go into effect in the absence of a negotiated
agreement. The parties would implement this default rule only if the
parties could not agree on annual allocation. To provide an incentive to
reach a negotiated settlement, this default rule could specify a more
limited catch then the parties would likely reach in negotiations. The
prospect of this reduced catch would spur the stakeholders to negotiate
and it would prevent them from benefiting from the collapse of
negotiations.
3. Compensation for Interceptions
Another solution requires one country to compensate the other for
interceptions of salmon. According to Canadian officials, the United
States has caught $650 million more in salmon than has Canada since the
countries signed the Pacific Salmon Treaty in 1985.500 To remedy this
imbalance, the United States considered establishing a fund to
compensate Canadian fishermen for overfishing, but British Columbia
Premier Clark opposed such a proposal, describing the fund as "a
dangerous concept" if the United States could continue to intercept
Canadian fish.5° Canadians argue that they expect economic benefits
from the salmon fishery in return for their efforts to preserve salmon
habitats, such as restricting logging and limiting urban development." 2
However, a tax on one country's interceptions of the other's fish could
provide the basis for a long-term allocation of salmon resources between
the two countries. Each country could adjust an interception tax by
species, abundance, and market value, as well as by the type of
fisherman: recreational, commercial, or tribal. The taxation of
interceptions would create real incentives for reducing interceptions by
both parties. Both fishing regulators and fishermen would take into
account the impact of this tax when deciding their annual goals.
500. See Editorial, Stuck in the Same Boat, Fin. Post (Toronto), Nov. 4, 1997, at 22.
501. Id.
502. See id.
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Furthermore, this type of taxation policy would create a fund that the
countries could use to enhance future salmon runs. Proceeds from this
fund would go to the country of origin to compensate for efforts to
conserve fragile salmon habitat. In addition, this type of tax on
interception would make the equity principle a practical reality rather
than just a theoretical goal.
To see how an interception tax would effect the supply and demand of
salmon-and the level of interceptions-this Article examines a simple
model of the market for salmon. Figure 4 shows that the supply and
demand of salmon leads to a market clearing price at P*, with the
quantity of salmon caught and sold at Q*. The supply of intercepted
salmon-a component in the total supply of salmon-also responds to
price of salmon. The market clearing price leads to a level of
interceptions of Q*int.
Figure 4: Market for Salmon Without Tax
Supply of Intercepted Salmon
Price of (no avoidance) Supply of All Salmon
Salmon
($ Ilb)
P* of -- - -- ---- - -- - -- -
salmon
I Demand for Salmon
Q*" of Q* of Quantity of Salmon
intercepted salmon
salmon
If an interception tax is imposed on the suppliers (the fishermen), the
shape of the supply curve for intercepted salmon changes, shifting the
overall supply curve. Figure 5 demonstrates how such a tax would
increase the price of all salmon and decrease the amount sold in the
market. Notice how the supply of intercepted salmon reacts more
strongly to the tax on interceptions than does the supply of all salmon.
Thus, number of salmon intercepted drops more than does the total catch
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of salmon. This reflects the likely result that some fishermen can avoid
interceptions. However, not all interceptions can be avoided because the
salmon stocks intermingle in the ocean. As fishermen and fish regulators
seek to avoid the tax, they will change their fishing habits and seek to
substitute their own salmon stocks for those of another country.
Figure 5: Market for Salmon with Tax on Interceptions
Supply of Intercepted Salmon
(with avoidance of tax)
Supply of All Salmon
(with tax)
Demand for Salmon
Ro °f<- Q*, C Oof <- Q*
intercepted salmon
salmon
This type of tax would likely be imposed at the point where fishermen
sell their catch to wholesale fish buyers.0 3 The difficult issue is how to
determine the amount of tax to impose. Estimating interceptions is part
science and part art. But this type of estimation provides an inadequate
basis for a tax-based regime. A more concrete method-perhaps one
based on random sampling of fish catches or on tagging of fish-could
determine the amount of tax each fishermen must pay.
4. Individual Tradable Fishing Rights
Finally, the last solution involves creating an international market-
based system of individual transferable quotas (ITQ). An ITQ system
503. A major issue is whether the United States or Canada has the authority to impose taxes on
Indian fishermen. This question depends on where the "incidence" of the taxation falls. However, it
is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this issue.
Price of
Salmon
($1 Ib)
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would assign each market participant a defined share of the total
allowable catch of available fish, generally based on the fishermen's or
boat's historical participation in the industry. Each market participant
would own these quotas in perpetuity, or until sold."° ITQs would
become an asset that the parties could sell, lease, or give away.5 The
value of the quota would vary depending on the market value of the
species, the total allowable catch established by fishery managers, the
health of the fish stock in the future, and the demand for that type of
quota. 6 An ITQ program would allow fishing industry participants to
earn a reasonable profit, while conserving oceanic species for future
generations of both fishermen and consumers.50 7
This system of transferable fishing rights currently exists in several
U.S. fisheries, including North Pacific halibut and sablefish, Mid-
Atlantic surf clams and ocean quahogs, and South Atlantic wreckfish.5 °8
Several other nations have implemented successful ITQ programs, such
as New Zealand,5' Australia, and Iceland."' Experts at a 1994 fisheries
conference held at the University of Washington generally supported the
transition of American fishery management to an ITQ system from the
current Olympic system.5 11 Furthermore, environmental organizations
such as the Environmental Defense Fund support the use of ITQs as a
"promising fishery management tool." ' 2 Although Congress has
established a moratorium on this type of fish management scheme
504. See, e.g., New Zealand Seafood Indus., Introduction to the Quota Management System
(QMS) (visited July 31, 1999) <http://www.seafood.co.nz/qmsintro.html> (explaining that New
Zealand's quotas were allocated to individuals with commercial fishing permits and were valid until sod).
505. See id.
506. See iad
507. See Tipton, supra note 10, at 385.
508. See At-Sea Processors Ass'n, Individual Transferable Quota Programs: Using Market-Based
Solutions to Solve Fisheries Management Problems (visited July 31, 1999) <htqp://www.atsea.org/
issues/itqpaper.html>.
509. See New Zealand Seafood Indus., supra note 504.
510. See At-Sea Processors Ass'n, supra note 508; Tipton, supra note 10, at 399-402.
511. See Tipton, supra note 10, at 398 (citing Ross Anderson, Annual Derby Day for Halibut:
Madness in the North Pacific, Seattle Times, July 10, 1994, at B5).
512. Individual Transferable Quotas for Fish Harvest Privileges: Hearing Before the U.S. House
ofRepresentatives Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcomm. on Fisheries Management,
103d Cong. (1994) (statement of Rodney M. Fujita, Ph.D., and D. Douglas Hopkins, LD., of the
Environmental Defense Fund) [hereinafter EDF Testimony on ITQs]. But see Individual
Transferable Quotas for Fish Harvest Privileges: Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcomm. on Fisheries Management, 103d Cong.
(1994) (statement of Greenpeace expressing concerns with rTQs).
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through October 2000, this waiting period would give fishery managers
the opportunity to carefully craft an international ITQ system to meet the
particular needs of the North Pacific salmon fishery." 3
An ITQ market scheme would shift the focus from a fishery "free-for-
all" to a system of allocating individual, definable property rights in
fishing resources. 14 Fishermen would no longer feel driven to catch as
many fish as possible in an ever-shorter fishing season. Fishermen would
have the opportunity to catch their allowed share in the safest, most
efficient, and most cost-effective means possible."' 5 ITQs provide for the
"enclosure and privatization of the common resources of the ocean" by
granting fishermen a defined share of the harvest." 6
In the North Pacific salmon fishery, tradable quota rights could be
issued to both the United States and Canada in proportion to the fish that
originate in their waters, minus the escapements required to sustain a
maximum yield in the future. When calculating the total allowable catch
for each of the species, fishery managers would consider empirical
biological data and consider the specific requirements for maintaining
sustainable fish stocks, rather than the preferences of politicians or
commercial interest groups."s 7 Each country's total allowable catch
would be divided between each of the regions or states, and divided
further between all fishery participants-commercial, recreational, and
tribal-based on historical catch data. Tribal fishermen could be given
the rights to harvest salmon equal to their Treaty rights.
The nature of the property right-its duration, exclusivity, divisibility,
and transferability-directly affects the success of a market-based system
for allocating fishing resources.1 The initial quota can be allocated as a
set quantity of stock or as a percentage of the determined total allowable
catch." 9 A percentage system would be less susceptible to legal
challenges if quota numbers decreased in future years, since tangible
numerical loss can more easily support a claim of a governmental taking
513. See Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(D)(1)(a)
(West Supp. 1998); see also Environmental Defense Fund, EDF Urges Nat 7 Committee to Endorse
Use of Individual Fishing Quotas to Help the Environment and Fishing Communities (last modified
Jan. 26, 1998) <http:llwww.edf.org/pubs/newsreleasesl1998/jan/'e%5Fredsnapper.html>.
514. See Tipton, supra note 10, at 397.
515. See id.
516. Id. (quoting Rights Based Fishing 3 (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1989)).
517. Seeid. at 385.
518. Seeid. at411.
519. Seeid. at410.
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under the Fifth Amendment. A percentage system would also give
government regulators greater flexibility to adjust quotas to accom-
modate the scientific and biological needs of the salmon.520
Individual transferable rights could initially be allocated to boat
owners or fishermen based on their past catch histories.52 These quotas
could either be given to industry participants or purchased for a fee.
Although the Magnuson Act prohibits the United States from charging
American fishermen for the right to harvest fish, the Act does permit
charging fees to cover administrative costs.5" American officials could
charge quota recipients rental rates that reflect the costs of administration
and enforcement and still stay within the requirements of the Magnuson
Act."2 This would pass the costs of the program to the industry
participants who benefit from the system.
The participants could then freely transfer quota rights in the market,
either by selling the rights outright or leasing them for a season. This
type of market approach would, in theory, allocate rights to those
individuals who value them most. Once allocated, the rights should be
renewable for each subsequent year or directly transferable to immediate
family members. The transferability of quota shares is important for
several reasons. First, a quota market allows new individuals to enter into
a fishery without increasing the total fishing effort.524 Second,
transferability allows fishermen to adjust their fishing effort to changing
circumstances, providing greater flexibility.5" Individuals can enter or
leave the fishery, or adjust their harvests by buying and selling shares.526
Third, the sale of quota shares provides a rational method for retiring
excess capacity in a fishery by compensating a person for leaving the
fishery.527
An ITQ system for Pacific salmon must regulate on a multi-species
basis to prevent fishermen from migrating away from regulated fisheries
520. See id.
521. In the United States, the Magnuson Act requires that all limited entry devices must' take
historical participation of a vessel into account, usually by examining past catch history. See 16
U.S.C. § 1853(b)(6) (1994).
522. See 16 U.S.C. § 1854(d)(1) (1994).
523. See Tipton, supra note 10, at 407.
524. See At-Sea Processors Ass'n, supra note 508.
525. See id
526. See Environmental Defense Fund, supra note 513.
527. See At-Sea Processors Ass'n, supra note 508.
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to other species. 28 If "lesser valued fish species are not covered in a
protective ITQ scheme at the outset, industry participants driven from the
higher valued fishery may move into the lesser valued fishery, thereby
bringing the problems of the first fishery into the second." '529 This would
create a domino effect on the fisheries,53 ° and could potentially harm
currently healthy fish populations in the North Pacific. 3 '
Enforcement would require analyzing records from both fishing
vessels and processors.532 A ticket system could help achieve compliance
with the ITQ quota rules. Tickets would be assigned to the owner of the
initial quota allocations, and new tickets would be passed out each
year. 33 The tickets would be transferable from owner to lessee and from
fishermen to processor.534 Each ticket should display the history of the
quota it represents: the original assignee, lessee if applicable, salmon
catch, and market destination.535 Fishermen would have to present their
quota licenses and turn over the necessary number of quota tickets at the
dockside before the processors could buy their captured fish.
Recreational and commercial fishermen could even purchase additional
shares at the dockside if their catch differed from their share allocation.
Under a ticket system, each onshore processor would have a file of
tickets for all the fish processed at that site. Enforcement officials could
check the ticket files against the records of the processor to prevent
processors from illegally accepting fish without quotas.536
An ITQ system should also harness the quota holders' own self-
interest and use basic deterrence to make the new system almost self-
regulating.537 ITQ shareholders would have incentives to report illegal
harvesting because poaching would result in depleted stocks, which
would in turn reduce the value of their ITQ permits. Poaching or misuse
of quotas must result in penalties severe enough to deter cheating.
Furthermore, enforcement officials should have the power to reduce the
528. See Tipton, supra note 10, at 411.
529. Id. at 414.
530. Seeid at414-15.
531. See id. at414.
532. See id. at 404.
533. Seeid. at418.
534. See id.
535. See id.
536. Seeid. at419.
537. See i. at 407 n.178.
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quota allocations of individuals who violate the rules of the ITQ system.
These forfeited quota rights could be sold, held as conservation
covenants by the government, or distributed by lottery to qualified
applicants.53 Multiple infractions could result in banishment from the
fishery altogether. 39 This would encourage individuals to report "illegal
activities in order to maintain the benefits of safer and more relaxed
fishing periods, higher market prices and the profitability of share
transfers."5
The benefits of an ITQ system include eliminating incentives to
overcapitalize, ending the "race for fish," enhancing crew and vessel
safety, increasing profits, and reducing pressure on managers to set
unsustainable harvest limits.54' ITQs can also reduce waste from the
dumping of incidental nontarget species. 2 By eliminating the "race for
fish" caused by increasingly shorter fishing seasons, fishermen can take
measures to avoid incidental catches without being penalized.' An ITQ
system may also improve the survival rates for discarded fish.5'
Fishermen would have time to handle "by-catch" more carefully, 5
because fishing seasons would be longer.
ITQs could also quell much of the contentious debate about the
allocation of salmon-fishing privileges between the United States and
Canada. Although the initial allocation of salmon-fishing quotas would
inevitably present an arduous and difficult task, market forces and the
exchange of quotas between fishermen would take over much of this
process. " This international market in fishing quota rights could also
resolve interception issues. American fishermen would have to buy rights
to Canadian fish in order to intercept salmon, and Canadian fishermen
would have to buy the rights to catch American salmon. Of course, it
538. See id at 420.
539. Seeid
540. Gloria Godsell & Mary Penny Thompson, Issues Surrounding the Gulf of Mexico Red
Snapper Fishery and the Impact of the Magnuson Act Reauthorization, 9 Tul. Envtl. L.. 267, 277
(1996).
541. See At-Sea Processors Ass'n, supra note 508.
542. See id.
543. See id
544. See EDF Testimony on ITQs, supra note 512.
545. "By-catch" is the unintended harvest of nontarget species. For instance, a fisherman may net
turtles, sea mammals, pink salmon and other species when fishing for sockeye salmon. These other
species are considered "by-catch." See id.
546. See id
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would be necessary to devise a means for salmon wholesalers and
enforcement officials to distinguish easily between American and
Canadian fish to implement an ITQ system.
This type of quota system could also contribute to international
conservation of salmon. An ITQ system gives fishermen an added
incentive to protect the continued viability of the resource because the
value of their quotas in the future depends on the level of the fish stock
in future seasons. 47 Quota shares for a percentage of the harvest
command much higher sale prices than do one-year leases, indicating
that quota holders attach real value to their stakes in future harvests. 48
As a result of this economic incentive, conservation efforts should also
increase. For example, under New Zealand's ITQ program fishing firms
have realized that the value of their ITQs depends on the health of the
fishery stock, and they have begun investing in voluntary efforts to
protect and conserve the fisheries.549
An ITQ system could also diminish the pressure placed on fishery
managers to raise the total allowable catches beyond sustainable limits. If
fishery managers did not protect the stocks in the current year, future
harvests would be reduced. This reduction in fish stocks would lower the
value of the quota owners' "property," which depends on future harvest
levels.550 As the salmon stocks begin to rebuild, the value of the
individual quotas would rise. Harnessing market forces for conservation
purposes could reverse the depletion of scarce salmon resources and
allow the rebuilding of salmon stocks.
The implementation of an ITQ system will likely cause a
consolidation in the commercial fishing fleet, as marginal fishermen sell
their allocation shares to those who value'them more. 5' In Iceland, for
instance, the proportion of quota shares held by the largest fishing firms
increased from 27.9% to 49.7% in ten years (between 1984 and 1994)
547. Incentives work to support the future viability of the stock if shares are granted for a long
period of time or are renewable each year, and if the shares are expressed as percentages of the total
allowable catch rather than as fixed numbers. See Tipton, supra note 10, at 397-98.
548. See EDF Testimony on ITQs, supra note 512.
549. See Daniel J. Dudek et al., Environmental Policy for Eastern Europe: Technology-Based
Versus Market-Based Approaches, 17 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 45 (1992).
550. This theory is sometimes called "free-market environmentalism," which emphasizes the
importance of well-defined property rights in private hands to prevent overuse of a natural public
resource. See Terry L. Anderson & Donald K. Leal, Free Market Versus Political Environmentalism,
15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 297, 303-04 (1992).
551. See Tipton, supra note 10, at 397.
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after the imposition of a fishing quota system." 2 If individual fishermen
decided to sell out to large firms, ITQs could change the character of a
fishing community and increase market concentration.53 This consoli-
dation would help to streamline an industry that many believe to be
overcapitalized and inefficient, with too large a fleet chasing too small a
fish population.55 4 Unlike other approaches, a quota -system would
compensate those fishermen who wish to exit the industry, because they
could sell their quota shares on the market.55 The ITQ quota system
could also be combined with a buy-back program in which individuals
looking to get out of fishing would receive compensation in excess of the
quota price.56 Fishery negotiators are already considering such a
voluntary buy-back (or "buy-out") program to reduce fishing capacity in
the Northwest salmon fleet.5 7
Although fishermen in both the United States and Canada may object
to an ITQ system for fear of being forced out of the industry, no one
would be forced to sell his or her quota share. Furthermore, nations could
design the ITQ program to prevent excessive concentration of market
power by establishing quota percentage caps, setting aside quotas for
recreational and tribal fishermen, and imposing other restrictions on quota
trading.558 Fishermen who remain in the industry could enjoy higher
returns on their investments under an ITQ system. 9 Thus, this type of
system could give fishermen and fishing communities greater job
552. See Gisli Pfisson, Learning by Fishing: Practice Science and Scientific Practice, in Property
Rights in a Social and Ecological Context: Case Studies and Design Applications 91 (Susan Hanna
& Mohen Manasinghe eds., 1995).
553. See EDF Testimony on 1TQs, supra note 512.
554. See Tipton, supra note 10, at 408.
555. See EDF Testimony on ITQs, supra note 512.
556. New Zealand implemented a buy-back program during the adoption of its ]TQ program in
1986 because the nation's fleet capacity was large in relation to the available catch. The program
also compensated the entire industry if the value of the quotas declined due to a severe drop in fish
stocks in any given season. See Tipton, supra note 10, at400-01.
557. See Pipkin Testimony, supra note 129.
558. See EDF Testimony on ITQs, supra note 512. For example, New Zealand's Fisheries Act
limits the quota that can be held by any one person or company. For main commercial species such
as Orange Roughy, Ling, and Hake, the limit is 45% of the quota in each area; for Rock Lobster the
limits are 10% of a management area, and for most other fish the limit is 20% of the fish stock. See
New Zealand Seafood Indus., supra note 504.
559. Australian fishermen experienced a rise in the average rates of return in one important
fishery, from 10.7% in 1992 to 16.5% in 1993. See Mark Lawson, Australia: Fishermen Net Good
Catches, Austl. Fin. Rev., Jan 12, 1994, at 7, quoted in Tipton, supra note 10, at 401.
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stability."6 ITQs would likely lengthen job terms, as boats could spend
more days fishing than under derby-style fishery management.5 6' As
salmon populations recovered and the allowable catches increased, the
system might even create more jobs as boats increase crew sizes. 62
Critics of an ITQ system in the United States have raised concerns that
an ITQ system would violate the public trust doctrine by conveying
property interests in a public resource-wild salmon.5 63 The public trust
doctrine is not an issue, however, if the ITQs are expressed as harvest
privileges rather than property rights." A well-designed ITQ system
should not create property rights that could form the basis for a takings
claim under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.161 These
claims could arise if a decrease in the total allowable catch reduced quota
values, or if the ITQ programs were dismantled.566 To avoid these
concerns, quotas should be expressed as a percentage of a variable
allowable catch, with full disclosure to quota holders of the risks of quota
ownership.567
Another potential problem with a quota system is "high grading,"
defined as "landing only the fish with the highest market value or grade
and throwing the rest overboard, dead or dying, so that it does not count
against the enterprise's quota."56 Generally, fisherman discard small,
immature, or low-value fish,569 which causes immense waste and
diminishes future stock runs. The ITQ system can be designed to limit
this problem, but likely could not eliminate high grading completely.
First, quotas should be specified by salmon species. Salmon prices
depend significantly on the species, with sockeye salmon the most
valuable and pink salmon the least valuable.7 Issuing quotas based on
560. See EDF Testimony on ITQs, supra note 512.
561. See id.
562. See id.
563. See id.
564. See id.
565. See Tipton, supra note 10, at 410.
566. See id.
567. See id. at 410 (citing James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on
Eminent Domain, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1277 (1985)); see also EDF Testimony on ITQs, supra note 512;
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation " Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).
568. Townsend & Wilson, supra note 34.
569. See Pdlsson, supra note 552, at 94.
570. See Huppert, supra note 2, at 1.
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salmon species would reduce the dumping of low-value species in order
to fill the quota with higher-valued fish. Second, quotas should be
expressed in terms of total weight or even total value.57 One study found
that although some ITQ programs can induce dumping, quota systems
that regulate the value of a harvest would not induce discarding. 72
Properly structuring the quota measures would reduce incentives to catch
only the most lucrative fish to fulfill the quota.
V. CONCLUSION
The dispute between the United States and Canada over North Pacific
salmon has raged on and off for many years. As the region grew and
placed more demands on the salmon stocks, the parties developed new
methods for protecting and sharing the resource. The 1985 Pacific
Salmon Treaty attempted to resolve many of the contentious issues over
conservation and allocation of salmon. However, the Treaty failed to
define adequately some of its most basic principles, and the Treaty's
mechanism for allocating salmo n has broken down.
The salmon war has now reached a critical juncture. For several years,
the United States and Canada have been unwilling to work together to
conserve salmon because of disagreements over allocation. Resolving
this problem will require each of the parties to make a good faith effort to
address the underlying issues of equity and conservation. New
negotiations may be necessary to define more carefully the principles of
the Treaty and to rectify problems of the Treaty mechanism. Alterna-
tively, the parties could try new methods such as a tax on interceptions or
a quota system that could more effectively allocate salmon resources
between the two countries.
The Pacific Northwest salmon war involves a complex interaction of
biology, economics, and law. To create a long and lasting truce in the
salmon war, these three areas must be resolved in a mutually supportive
fashion.
571. Although a quota specifying the total value to be caught would effectively solve the high
grading problem, it could create difficulties in other areas. Specifically, total allowable catches are
generally expressed in volume (weight) terms. Establishing the total value of the allowable catch by
predicting the market price of salmon would add additional uncertainty to an already uncertain and
difficult scientific measure.
572. See Matthew A. Turner, Economics Without Free-Disposal: Quota-Induced Discardings in
Heterogeneous Fisheries (visited July 31, 1999) <http'J/ideas.uqam.ca/ideas/data/papers/
tortecipamturner-95-02.html>.
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VI. EPILOGUE
As this article was in the editing process, the United States and
Canada reached a comprehensive agreement on salmon management.
The U.S. negotiating team was led by James Pipkin, in coordination with
Senior White House Representative Lloyd Cutler, and included
representatives of the Governors of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and
twenty-four Indian tribes.573 The Canadian negotiating team was led by
Donald McRae and included Canadian Minister of Fisheries and Oceans,
David Anderson. 74
On June 30, 1999, Acting Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering and
Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Raymond A.J. Chretien,
signed the new Pacific Salmon Agreement. 75 The United States and
Canada exchanged diplomatic notes576 to bring into force a comprehen-
sive accord ending their dispute over Pacific salmon management. The
agreement replaces key provisions of the Pacific Salmon Treaty,577
addressing the conservation and equity issues that have plagued the 1985
Treaty. 78 By providing long-range harvest agreements, the revised
Treaty increases stability and predictability in salmon management.579
The agreement also funds measures to restore depleted stocks of salmon
and to enhance salmon production. 5" This epilogue outlines key
elements of the revised Treaty.
573. See Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. and Canada to Sign Pacific Salmon
Agreement (last modified June 29, 1999) <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1999/
ps990629c.html>.
574. See Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
& Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, Joint Statement on the Pacific Salmon Agreement
(last modified June 3, 1999) <http://secretary.state.govl www/statements/1999/990603.html>.
575. See Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 573.
576. See Bureau of Oceans & Int'l Envtl. & Scientific Affairs, Diplomatic Note, Canada (last
modified June 30, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/oceans/990630_salmon-canen.pdf>
[hereinafter Canada Diplomatic Note]; Bureau of Oceans & Invtl. Envtl. & Scientific Affairs,
Diplomatic Note, United States (last modified June 30, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/
www/global/oes/oceans/990630_salmon-usaen.pdfa> [hereinafter United States Diplomatic Note].
577. Annex I is amended, and Annex IV is replaced in its entirety. See United States Diplomatic
Note, supra note 576. Additional attachments to the Treaty detail other aspects of the agreement,
such as the regional funds, scientific cooperation, and habitat restoration. See id.
578. See Bureau of Oceans & Int'l Envtl. & Scientific Affairs, Summary of the Pacfic Salmon
Agreement (last modified June 30, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/oceans/
fs_990603 salmon.html> [hereinafter Bureau of Oceans Summary].
579. See id.
580. See id.
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A. Fishery Management
The revised Treaty creates abundance-based fishing regimes for
salmon fisheries, allowing catches to vary from year to year."8' The
Treaty allows relatively large harvests when salmon runs are strong, but
parties must reduce their harvests in years when abundance is low. 82
Abundance-based fishery management should be more responsive to
salmon conservation than the fixed harvest ceilings of the original
Treaty.58
3
The agreement replaces expired provisions of Annex IV of the 1985
Pacific Salmon Treaty with several new "chapters." '5 The new accord
establishes criteria for managing the fisheries covered under the Pacific
Salmon Treaty, and also includes management of some northern coho
fisheries that were not covered in the old Treaty.8 The agreement on the
Fraser River sockeye fishery will last for twelve years, beginning in
1999. All other fishery arrangements will be in effect for ten years.5 86
Both governments have agreed that compliance with the revised fishery
regimes satisfies the principles of the Pacific Salmon Treaty.587
1. Transboundary Rivers
Chapter 1 of the new Treaty addresses management of sockeye, coho,
chinook, and pink salmon in several rivers that flow from Canada
through the Alaskan panhandle, such as the Stikine, Taku, and Alsek
rivers. 8 Canadian harvests would likely increase under these new
arrangements. If the new agreement had been in effect from 1985-1998,
Canadian fishermen could have harvested 16,400 additional sockeye on
the Taku River, 80,800 additional coho on the Taku River, and 7000
additional coho on the Stikine River.5 89
581. See id.
582. See id
583. See id.
584. See Id.
585. See a
586. See id
587. See Canada Diplomatic Note, supra note 576; United States D'plomatic Note, supra note 576.
588. See Bureau of Oceans Summary, supra note 578.
589. See Canada Dep't of Fisheries, Transboundary Rivers (last modified June 3, 1999)
<http:llwww.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/COMMUNICIBACKGROU/1999/hq29(109)_e.htm>.
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2. Northern British Columbia and Southeast Alaska
Chapter 2 deals with sockeye and pink salmon fisheries in southeast
Alaska and northern British Columbia. 90 The agreement establishes
abundance-based fishery management regimes to achieve conservation
and equitable sharing of intermingled salmon stocks.59' The new
provisions resolve long-contentious issues surrounding Alaska's Noyes
Island purse seine fisheries and the Tree Point gillnet fishery, as well as
Canada's marine net and troll fisheries for pink salmon in Canadian
Area 1.592 According to Canadian estimates, these changes could
substantially reduce Alaska's catch while increasing Canada's catch. If
the new arrangements had been in place from 1985-1997, Alaskan
fishermen would have caught 465,000 fewer sockeye at Noyes Island
while Canadian troll fishermen in Area 1 would have caught more than
3,000,000 additional pink salmon. 9'
3. Chinook Salmon
Chapter 3 governs management of both ocean and freshwater chinook
fisheries in Alaska, Canada, Washington, and Oregon. 94 The agreement
divides these fisheries into two categories: (1) aggregate abundance-
based management (AABM fisheries),5 95 and (2) individual stocks based
management (ISBM fisheries).596 The harvest rate of AABM fisheries
will vary each year depending on the abundance of different salmon
stocks present in that particular fishery.597 For ISBM fisheries, both
590. See Bureau of Oceans Summary, supra note 578.
591. See id.
592. See id.
593. See Canada Dep't of Fisheries, Northern Boundary Sockeye and Pink Fisheries (last
modified June 3, 1999) <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/COMMUNIC/BACKGROU/1999/
q29(105)_e.htm>.
594. See Bureau of Oceans Summary, supra note 578.
595. These ocean fisheries occur in large areas and affect a complex aggregation of many stocks,
such as the Southeast Alaska troll, net, and sport fishery; the northern British Columbia troll and
Queen Charlotte Islands sport fishery; and the West Coast Vancouver Island troll and outside sport
fishery. See id.
596. These ISBM fisheries include the troll, net, and sport fishieries in central and southern
British Columbia, Washington, and Oregon. They also encompass the freshwater fisheries of
Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. They do not cover the troll and sport fisheries of the west coast of
Vancouver Island. See id.
597. Each fishery has different types of salmon stocks with different survival rates. Thus, the
allowable harvest will vary by fishery and from year to year. See id.
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countries must reduce exploitation rates relative to the base period of
1979-82.'9' Canada must reduce its harvests of certain depressed chinook
stocks by 36.5% and the United States must reduce its harvests by
40%.5 Canada has already reduced its harvest rates to near the targeted
level in recent years, but the United States must significantly reduce its
current catch levels to reach the specified target.'
Additional reductions are specified if these reductions are insufficient
to achieve escapement objectives. 1 Within those catch limits, each
country may decide how to distribute the harvest across different
fisheries and competing interests.' The new Treaty would also credit
countries for reducing fishing mortalities. 3 This provision would
encourage more selective fisheries, reduce incidental mortality, and
improve spawning levels for chinook salmon stocks.'
4. Fraser River Sockeye and Pink Salmon
The revised agreement requires a substantial reduction in the
American share of Fraser River sockeye. °5 These reductions will be
phased in between the 1999 and 2002 fishing seasons.: 6 The U.S. share
of this harvest will fall from 26% (as specified in the first four years of
the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty) to 16.5% of the total allowable catch by
2002."° Each percentage point increases the Canadian catch by nearly
300,000 sockeye over the next four years."° The U.S. share of Fraser
pink salmon will be 25.7% of the total allowable catch.
Washington and the U.S. federal government will try to mitigate the
impact of this reduction by creating a license buy-back program for
598. See Canada Dep't of Fisheries, Coastwide Chinook (last modified June 3, 1999)
<http:llwww.dfo-mpo.gc.caICOMMUNIClBACKGROU/19991hq29(104)_e.htm>.
599. See Bureau of Oceans Summary, supra note 578.
600. See id
601. See id.
602. See id.
603. See Canada Dep't ofFisheries, supra note 598.
604. See id
605. See Bureau of Oceans Summary, supra note 578.
606. See id
607. See id
608. See Canada Dep't ofFisheries, Fraser River Sockeye and Pink Salmon (last modified June 3,
1999) <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.caICOMMUNICIBACKGROU19991hq29(103)_e.htm>.
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commercial fishermen.6 "9 This program will pay non-Indian fishermen to
stop fishing, reducing Washington's sockeye harvest.610 This removal of
non-Indian fishermen will also skew the fifty-fifty sharing rule between
Indians and non-Indians. 61' Treaty tribes will have a sixty-eight-percent
share of the Fraser sockeye harvest, and nontreaty fishermen will have
thirty-two percent of that catch.
5. Coho Salmon
Chapter 5 addresses management of coho stocks in both the Northern
and Southern regions. In the Northern region, the agreement restricts
Alaska's troll fisheries to satisfy Canada's conservation concerns.6 '3 The
revised provisions call for Alaska to shut down fisheries if Canada's
early season catch indicators show a low abundance of coho returning to
spawn.614 These restrictions on Alaskan fishing will assist Canada in
conserving threatened coho stocks. 615
For southern coho salmon, the agreement provides a guideline for a
conservation-based regime in southern British Columbia and
Washington.616 These guidelines seek to limit harvest rates on coho
stocks to sustainable levels, taking into account all fisheries affecting the
stocks.617 Reducing harvest rates will enhance the long-term production
of salmon in both countries.6 18 The parties will develop detailed
management plans for coho salmon over the next year, in time for the
2000 fishery season.619 For 1999, both countries will manage their coho
fisheries consistent with their 1998 regimes.62
The revised Treaty also alters the way each country's fishing limits
are counted. Fishery limits under the new agreement will be based on
609. See Bureau of Oceans Summary, supra note 578.
610. See id.
611. See id.
612. See id.
613. See Canada Dep't of Fisheries, Northern Coho (last modified June 3, 1999)
<http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/COMMUNICIBACKGROU/1999/hq29(106)_e.htm>.
614. See id.
615. See id.
616. See Bureau ofOceans Summary, supra note 578.
617. See id.
618. See id.
619. See id.
620. See id.
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mortality (the number of coho killed), rather than the landed catch.62'
These mortality limits on coho salmon stocks will be calculated based on
the expected abundance of coho runs in each country.6' This change in
counting method should encourage more-targeted fisheries and less
wasteful fishing methods.
6. Southern British Columbia and Washington Chum Salmon
The new agreement revises provisions affecting chum salmon
fisheries in the Strait of Georgia and Puget Sound.' 2 Catch allocations
will not be greatly affected.624 However, Canada did agree to require
fishermen to release live chum caught in certain net fisheries.6' This
provision will improve the survival rates of summer chum stocks, which
the United States recently listed as threatened under the Endangered
Species Act.626
B. Regional Funds
The new agreement also creates two regional funds to address salmon
restoration and enhancement needs.627 The Northern Boundary and
Transboundary Rivers Restoration and Enhancement Fund ("Northern
Fund") provides for northern and central British Columbia, southeast
Alaska, and the Alsek, Taku, and Stikine livers." The Southern
Boundary Restoration and Enhancement Fund ("Southern Fund") will
fund improvements in southern British Columbia, Washington, Oregon,
and the Snake River basin in Idaho.629 The United States will contribute
seventy-five million dollars to the Northern Fund, and sixty-five million
dollars to the Southern Fund over a four-year period.60
621. See Canada Dep't of Fisheries, Southern Coho (last modified June 3, 1999)
<http://www.fo-mpo.gc.ca/COMMUNIC/BACKGROU/1999/hq29(107_e.htm>.
622. See id
623. See Bureau of Oceans Summary, supra note 578.
624. See id
625. See id
626. See id
627. See id
628. See id
629. Seeki
630. See id
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The United States and Canada will manage each of the regional funds
bilaterally through a committee composed of three representatives from
each country.63' This money can be spent to improve resource
management information, improve salmon habitat, and enhance wild
stock production.632 The bilateral committee may spend only the interest
earned by the funds.633 Expenditures will be suspended if the harvest
agreement of Annex IV expires and will resume only after the Parties
agree to a new fishing arrangement.634
C. Institutional and Scientific Changes
The new agreement also seeks to improve bilateral cooperation,
enhance scientific information about salmon management, and change
the procedures of the Pacific Salmon Commission.635 Both countries will
improve the collection, sharing, and application of scientific data
concerning salmon, and provide opportunities for greater exchange of
information between each country's management agencies.636
Several changes to the Pacific Salmon Commission will improve the
functioning of this important institution. A new bilateral Committee on
Scientific Cooperation will be established to advise the Pacific Salmon
Commission on its research, scientific, and monitoring needs. 3 The
Committee will consist of up to eight nominees by the two national
sections of the Pacific Salmon Commission,638 with both governmental
and nongovernmental representation.639 The Pacific Salmon Commission
631. See id The agreement left the details of acceptance, review, evaluation, and approval of
proposals to each fund committee to decide. See Northern Boundary and Transboundary Rivers
Restoration and Enhancement Fund, $ 7 (visited July 31, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www
/globalloes/oceans/90630 salmon.attach.c.pdf>; Southern Boundary Restoration and Enhancement
Fund, $ 7 (visited July 31, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/
oceans/90630_salmon.attach_c.pdf>.
632. See Bureau of Oceans Summary, supra note 578.
633. See id.
634. See id.
635. See id.
636. See id.
637. See id.
638. See id.
639. See Canadian Dep't of Fisheries, Improved Science and Fisheries Management
Arrangements (last modified June 3, 1999) <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/COMMUNIC/
BACKGROU/1999/HQ29(11 l)_e.htm>.
694
Vol. 74:605, 1999
Pacific Salmon Treaty
is also charged with developing rules and procedures to implement the
technical dispute resolution process of Article XII of the Treaty.'
D. Habitat
Finally, the agreement addresses important initiatives to protect
salmon habitat to improve salmon production for both parties."1 Salmon
production may be enhanced by assuring adequate water quality and
quantity, improving spawning conditions, and ensuring migration
corridors for adult and juvenile salmon. 2 The Pacific Salmon
Commission must report annually on salmon habitat and restoration. 3
The report must identify salmon stocks, examine nonfishing factors that
may limit production, assess options for addressing these factors, and
track the progress of both countries in improving production."
E. Conclusion on the New Salmon Agreement
This most recent agreement between the United States and Canada
represents an important step in salmon conservation and management.
The comprehensive, long-term accord will enable both countries to share
salmon harvests equitably, improve habitat and production, and ensure
the viability of salmon industries. Rather than fixing annual harvest
ceilings, the new Treaty provides for flexible harvest rates to account for
variations in the health of certain stocks. The new regimes will be in
effect for ten to twelve years, thereby avoiding the annual conflict
resulting from interest-based negotiations. Continued cooperation
between the United States and Canada will ensure the long-term viability
of the salmon, as well as the industries that rely on these stocks.
640. See Bureau of Oceans Summary, supra note 578.
641. See id.
642. See id
643. See id
644. See id
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